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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing has become big business with organizations spending millions of 
dollars creating and deploying cloud solutions.  However, adoption of this multi-tenant and 
dynamic technology has been slowed by security concerns.  In this dissertation, to help 
increase adoption by reducing security risks, we examine three research questions.   First, how 
can we detect attacks on cloud tenant instances without specific knowledge of tenant 
applications?  Second, how can we assist cloud providers with interpretation of the alert 
output from security controls in an IaaS cloud environment to improve security?  And, third, 
how can we help protect cloud tenants from insider data theft attacks? 
To answer these questions, we utilize the design science research methodology to 
accomplish the objective of creating and demonstrating a new system composed of novel 
security controls addressing each research question.  We posit a system comprised of three 
security control artifacts to assist cloud providers with improving their overall security 
posture.  Our proposed system consists of three components:  A Hypervisor-based Cloud 
Intrusion Detection System (HCIDS), a Streaming Cloud Intrusion Monitoring and 
Classification System (SCIMCS), and a system for detecting insider attacks within cloud 
computing environments.   
First, HCIDS utilizes data from hypervisors running on cloud controller nodes to 
detect and classify abnormal usage.  Instantiation and demonstration of the system reveals a 
100 percent detection rate for denial of service attacks from and against virtual machines.  
Second, SCIMCS addresses the problem of information overload from alerts generated by 
security controls in dynamic multi-tenant cloud environments.  Implementation and 
evaluation of this approach divulges an average message reduction rate of 95.9 percent based 
on our experimentation.  Third, the system for detecting insider data theft examines node 
system state and anomalies in network bytes transmitted as well as number of active user 
counts to detect virtual machine and data store theft.  This approach demonstrates a 100 
percent detection rate for data theft and unapproved logins on cloud nodes. 
Each of these components plays a unique role in improving the overall security 
posture in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Cloud Computing Environments.  The 
combination of each approach makes up an overall system that addresses intrusion detection 
 v 
while preserving privacy, information overload from a plethora of controls deployed in a 
defense in depth strategy, and the concern of insider data theft.  Furthermore, each component 
is designed, instantiated, demonstrated and communicated at respected conferences.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 25, 2006, Amazon EC2, one of the leading Infrastructure as a Service 
cloud providers, went into beta  (Barr, 2006).  Since then, cloud computing has become big 
business with organizations spending millions of dollars creating cloud solutions.  The largest 
technology companies in the world now provide cloud computing offerings and solutions 
(Google, 2015; IBM, 2015; Microsoft, 2015).  However, cloud computing is not without its 
challenges.  More specifically, since the inception of cloud computing, security and privacy 
have been an ongoing concern that has slowed adoption of the technology (Kandukuri, Paturi, 
& Rakshit, 2009; Lori, 2010; Ren, Wang, & Wang, 2012; Takabi, Joshi, & Ahn, 2010).   In 
chapter one, we explore the background of our research problem, provide a concise problem 
statement, and define the objectives of this dissertation project. 
Background of the Problem 
In 2014, IDG Enterprise reported the results of a survey on cloud computing which 
revealed that 45 percent of respondents had cloud projects return to internal information 
technology teams.  Furthermore, 59 percent of the respondents who indicated projects were 
brought back in house stated security concerns were a contributing factor (IDG, 2014).  The 
number of cloud providers and organizations considering cloud computing as a paradigm for 
deploying information technology solutions combined with the continuing concern over 
security makes cloud computing security an interesting and worthwhile research topic to 
explore.   
In order to comprehend the importance of this problem, one first must have an 
understanding of cloud computing.  Cloud computing can be defined as a model for enabling 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned 
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction (Armbrust et al., 
2009).  In a general sense, a cloud computing environment can be defined as public or private 
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interconnected computers that provide shared computing power without presenting the 
underlying structure (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009).   
A more precise definition of cloud computing is provided by NIST and illustrated in 
Figure 1.  The NIST definition of cloud computing states that the cloud model consists of five 
essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models (Mell & Grance, 
2011).  The essential characteristics consist of broad network access, rapid elasticity, 
measured service, and on-demand self-service.  The service models include Software as a 
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (Iaas).  The 
deployment models are made up of Public Cloud, Private Cloud, Hybrid Cloud, and 
Community Cloud. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Illustration of NIST Cloud Computing Definition 
 
 As stated, cloud computing spans several service and deployment models.  However, 
the essential characteristics are crucial to the definition.   Unlike previous IT environments, 
cloud computing environments provide broad network access, typically from the Internet.  In 
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addition, resources can be provisioned and deprovisioned quickly, charges are generally based 
on usage, and tenants of these environments perform provisioning and usage activities without 
extensive interactions with IT departments or administrators.  Furthermore, resources are 
shared, many times between different tenants.  The multi-tenant nature and lack of control 
over the underlying infrastructure open up several security challenges and questions. 
The focus of our research is on Public Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud 
environments.  Infrastructure as a Service cloud environments provide cloud tenants with the 
capability to provision computing resources to run arbitrary software and operating systems.  
The tenant does not control the underlying infrastructure but does have control over the 
provisioned instance.  Essentially, tenants are given access to computing resources in order to 
perform computing activities as needed.  The public deployment model provides unique 
challenges over other hosted information technology environments in that the environment is 
shared possibly among tenants, some of whom may be competitors or bad actors.   
To secure these environments, the Cloud Security Alliance, a leading group on cloud 
computing security, published the security guidance report that recommends a security 
approach which utilizes a defense in depth (SANS, 2001) strategy where people, process, and 
layers of technology all play a role in securing a cloud environment (Cloud Security Alliance, 
2011).  Their approach to securing IaaS cloud environments involves processes, procedures, 
controls, and audits.  No single technology has been shown to address all of the security 
concerns in cloud environments.  Furthermore, managing multiple processes, procedures, and 
controls in an effective manner is nontrivial with many open research questions.   
Statement of the Problem 
Our research aims to address security and privacy concerns through the instantiation 
of a system composed of novel technical cloud security artifacts.  More specifically, we 
examine the problems of detecting bad actors in cloud environments earlier while preserving 
the privacy of cloud tenants.  We posit three design science research questions.  First, how can 
we detect attacks on cloud tenant instances without specific knowledge of tenant applications 
in order to preserve privacy?  Second, how can we assist cloud providers with interpreting the 
output from security controls in an IaaS cloud environment to improve security?  And, third, 
how can we help protect cloud tenants from insider data theft attacks?    
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Objectives of the Project 
Our research contribution from this work is demonstrated through three security 
artifacts making up a system to assist cloud providers with securing Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) cloud computing environments.  Although no one technical solution is going to 
completely remove the security threats and risks within multi-tenant cloud computing 
environments, additional security artifacts will help to improve the overall security posture of 
these environments.  As the security posture in these environments improves, cloud tenants 
will gain more confidence in the security of these environments.  We believe that the long 
term end result will be less risk for cloud tenants resulting in increased adoption of IaaS cloud 
computing.  
Summary 
In this chapter, we introduced our research topic and provided an introduction to cloud 
computing and some of the security issues.  Furthermore, at a high level, we described the 
general security challenges facing these environments, stated our research problem, and 
provided the objectives of our research project.  Chapter two provides a more detailed 
discussion on cloud computing and a literature review of security related challenges 
associated with these environments. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cloud computing provides several opportunities for organizations to optimize 
resources and reduce costs.  However, these benefits do not come without challenges and 
security risks.  This chapter is broken into two parts, both based on existent literature.  First, 
we briefly examine the history and provide a detailed definition of cloud computing.  Second, 
we present the findings of our cloud computing security challenges literature review. 
History and Definition of Cloud Computing  
In a general sense, a cloud computing environment can be defined as public or private 
interconnected computers that provide shared computing power without presenting the 
underlying structure (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010).  The idea of cloud computing is not new.  The 
original concepts date back to the 1960s (Kaufman, 2009).  Cloud computing as it is known 
today has emerged from the construction of large scale commodity-computer datacenters 
combined with advances in the World Wide Web and Web 2.0 (Armbrust et al., 2010).  
Developments in virtualization technology on commodity hardware helped to provide the 
underlying technology for rapid provisioning and de-provisioning of resources in a cost 
effective manner.   In order to understand cloud computing and associated security issues, one 
first must understand the different services offered and deployment models.  The consensus 
within literature describes cloud computing as one of following services:  Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS).    
IaaS can be described as offering information technology infrastructure as a service. 
This is similar to outsourcing the datacenter.  However, unlike traditional data center 
outsourcing, cloud tenants use self-service mechanisms to provision and deprovision 
resources and may share these environments with other unrelated and unknown tenants.  In 
addition, cloud customers are typically charged for the resources that they use.  Examples of 
IaaS include:  Amazon AWS, IBM Softlayer, and Oracle’s Cloud Service.   
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The PaaS model can be described as a shared development environment that is 
provided as a service.  The provider offers blocks of code, or application program interfaces 
(APIs), which developers use to create web based applications that are stored in the providers 
cloud environment.  Some examples of PaaS are:  IBM Bluemix, Force.com, and Google App 
Engine.   
In the SaaS model, end users do not purchase software and store it locally.  Rather, 
software remains in a remote location referred to as a “cloud.”  The customer pays based upon 
usage.  The backend infrastructure is physically shared among customers, but it is logically 
divided among end users.  Examples of Saas include: Google Docs and Zoho (Almulla & 
Chan Yeob, 2010). 
There are three deployment models in cloud computing:  private cloud, public cloud, 
and hybrid, or mixed, cloud environment.  Private cloud is for internal use by an organization.  
Private clouds reside within an organization’s internal data center.  Because the organization 
controls the data center, this cloud model is as secure as the data center.  Public clouds are 
cloud computing environments that are hosted by providers, available to the general public, 
and are typically based on a pay per use model.  In public implementations and offerings, the 
cloud computing infrastructure is available via the Internet (Katzan, 2010).  A mixed cloud 
environment may be a community cloud or a hybrid cloud deployment.  Community cloud is 
a shared cloud among multiple organizations usually with a shared interest.  Hybrid Clouds 
are a mix of public and private cloud environments.  Hybrid clouds generally consist of a 
private cloud with interfaces to external cloud services.  Hybrid clouds provide organizations 
with cloud computing advantages but with less risk than public clouds (Katzan, 2010; 
Ramgovind, Eloff, & Smith, 2010). 
Cloud computing provides two significant advantages over other technologies:  
elasticity and cost.  First, it provides organizations with flexibility to scale up or scale down 
their information technology as needed to meet the demands of the organization.  From a 
physical resource perspective, cloud computing allows organizations to provision new 
resources as needed which relieves some of the planning burden.  Cloud users can start using 
a small environment and provision upward as needed and only pay for what is used  
(Armbrust, et al., 2010; Doelitzscher, Reich, & Sulistio, 2010).   This feature, typically termed 
elasticity, is one of the primary features that sets cloud computing apart from previous, similar 
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technologies (Owens, 2010).  Second, it provides computing power at an affordable cost that 
would not otherwise be available to users previous to the inception of cloud computing 
(Kaufman, 2009). 
Some of the key characteristics of cloud computing include:  on-demand self-service, 
broad network access, resource pooling, and measured service.  Thanks to the increase in 
affordable network bandwidth, reliable networks, and the Internet, it is possible for cloud 
computing providers to offer high quality data and software services that reside in remote data 
centers (Cong, Qian, Kui, & Wenjing, 2009).  Cloud computing can provide cost effective 
pay-as-you-go information technology environments (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010). 
Organizations that leverage cloud computing will likely achieve savings in hardware, 
software, time provisioning servers, productivity, and system administration.  Savings in 
hardware will occur due to the reduction in the number of servers required to complete work, 
less data center floor space, and reduction in power consumption.  Software costs will likely 
decrease due to less operation system licenses being needed and reduced software 
maintenance cost.  Server provisioning takes less time with automated provisioning 
technology and tools.  Productivity can be improved by cloud support staff rapidly responding 
to end user requests.  Even system administration costs will likely decrease as less system 
administrators will be required to manage more systems (Almulla & Chan Yeob, 2010).   
The benefits are clear and likely to result in continued adoption of the cloud 
computing paradigm.  This is evident based on a October 30, 2009 report released by Gartner 
Inc. that stated cloud computing has become a top significant technology issue (Chang-Lung, 
Uei-Chin, Chang, & Chun-Jung, 2010).  However, this paradigm might not be appropriate for 
all industries (Kaufman, 2009).   A survey of federal government agencies funded by the 
Lockheed Martin Cyber Security Alliance found that 70 percent of those surveyed were 
concerned about data security, privacy, and integrity in a cloud computing environment 
(Anonymous, 2010).  In another survey of more than 170 businesses, 50 percent of the 
respondents stated concerns with security issues relating to cloud computing resources (Biggs 
& Vidalis, 2010).  Multiple surveys have shown security to be ranked first as the greatest 
challenge or issue of cloud computing (Popovic & Hocenski, 2010).   Although cloud services 
can relieve organizations of hosting burdens and reduce costs, a number of security concerns 
continue to plaque the cloud computing paradigm.   
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Cloud Computing Security Challenges Literature Review 
Our literature review is conducted in two parts.  First, we perform a general literature 
review of cloud computing security issues in this chapter.  Second, chapters four, five, and six 
contain a related works section which presents the results of literature reviews specifically 
targeting the components of the system posited in this dissertation.  The literature review in 
this chapter follows the methodology outlined in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Literature Review Methodology 
 
The literature review revealed 16 general security topics relating to cloud computing 
security:  Auditability, Availability of Data, Data Location, Data Segregation, Data Storage 
Correctness, Disaster Recovery, Investigative Support, Long Term Viability / Data Lock-in, 
Performance, Privacy, Regulatory Compliance, Reputation Fate Sharing, Restricted Access, 
Security Controls, Trust and SLAs, and Trusted Interfaces.  We summarize each of these 
topics below: 
 
Auditability 
Cloud computing does not necessarily offer a guarantee for data integrity and 
availability.  It is of critical importance to enable public auditability for cloud data storage so 
that the tenants have the ability to use a third party auditor for achieving appropriate risk 
9 
levels for the privacy protection of data (Armbrust, et al., 2010; Cong, Qian, Kui, & Wenjing, 
2010). 
 
Availability of Data 
The outsourced nature of cloud computing raises concerns of ensuring availability of 
data.  When an organization moves data and applications to a cloud environment, it loses 
control of the data which makes ensuring data availability difficult (Zhang, Wuwong, Li, & 
Zhang, 2010).  In addition, data availability includes the capability of a cloud provider to 
move data to alternative environments if one environment becomes compromised (Armbrust, 
et al., 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  An example of where data availability became an issue 
in a cloud computing environment is when Liquid Motors lost all of its servers in a data center 
raid, then lost its suit against the FBI (Neumann, 2009).   
Cloud availability threats also include risks from network based attacks, such as 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, as well as the cloud service provider’s 
environment setup and competence level (Almulla & Chan Yeob, 2010; Owens, 2010).  A 
proper risk management process is needed to address the risks of moving applications and 
data into a cloud computing environment to ensure availability (Messmer, 2009). 
 
Data Location 
Data location is concerned with the physical location of data and whether a cloud 
provider will allow a tenant to dictate where data is located (Barnes, 2010; Doelitzscher, et al., 
2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  There are confidentiality issues pertaining to where data is 
stored and where the data has travelled.  In a cloud environment, data is relocated for 
optimized storage, but each time when the data is moved, a copy may be retained at the 
location (Acello, 2010; Almulla & Chan Yeob, 2010).   
One example of where location plays a critical role is with Germany’s Federal Data 
Protection Act.  This act states that personal data can only be transferred for processing into 
countries with the same adequate level of privacy protection laws.  Whenever personal data is 
acquired and/or processed by third-party instances, the affected person must be notified 
according to this act.  Users must know the exact location of their data and the cloud 
provider’s court of jurisdiction (Doelitzscher, et al., 2010). 
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Data Segregation 
Data segregation is the assurance that data is separated using trusted encryption 
techniques and technologies (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  Data isolation is not 
trivial in a multi-tenant environment.  Appropriate tools are required to ensure proper data 
protection is available in shared environments (Naqvi, Dallons, & Ponsard, 2010).  In 
addition, concerns around virtualization security exist, including threats specific to virtual 
environments and shared hypervisors.  Although it may be cost-effective to use a shared 
administrative management system to manage multiple customer environments, concerns 
around data segregation exist (Owens, 2010).   
 
Data Storage Correctness 
Data is typically stored in multiple physical locations in a cloud environment and can 
move to other locations rapidly.  Maintaining data integrity in these dynamic environments 
may present technical issues that increase data integrity risk if not properly managed.  Tenants 
must be assured that the cloud provider can competently manage the complexity of these 
dynamic environments (Cong, et al., 2009). 
 
Disaster Recovery 
Recoverability encompasses the ability to recover data in the cloud environment when 
an unplanned event occurs.  Before moving data or applications to a cloud computing 
environment, an organization should understand the cloud computing providers plan for 
recovering from disasters (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  
  
Investigative Support 
Investigative support is the ability of the vendor to provide forensic analysis and 
investigative support when illegal activities occur (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  If 
a security breach occurs, gathering evidence from cloud computing environments can be 
difficult because of the underlying dynamic nature of the environment.  Data is typically 
spread dynamically across multiple hosts and data centers and maintaining chain of custody 
during investigation can be problematic (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010; Wolthusen, 2009).  
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  Legal and regulatory concerns relating to cloud computing jurisdiction of data that 
crosses borders are nontrivial.  It is not clear if governments have access to cloud data that 
spans borders (Kaufman, 2009).  Cross-border placement of data can result in compliance 
issues and can hinder cybercrime investigations (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010). 
 
Long Term Viability / Data Lock-in 
Long term viability refers to concerns surrounding the ability to retrieve data from a 
cloud computing environment if the provider no longer meets the needs of the tenant or goes 
out of business.  There is an ongoing concern about proprietary data formats and whether data 
can be retrieved in the case the tenant wishes to leave the cloud environment (Armbrust, et al., 
2010; Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010). 
 
Performance 
A concern exists relating to performance of the cloud environment and data transfer 
bottlenecks (Armbrust, et al., 2010).  Virtualization technologies and shared environments 
may slow processing capabilities of systems.  Furthermore, security controls protecting data 
flowing over the Internet and being processed as well as stored within a cloud environment 
may reduce performance.  Although benefits can be achieved by leveraging cloud computing 
for certain applications, there are likely hidden operational and performance costs (Bauer, 
2010). 
 
Privacy 
When a cloud provider houses large amounts of data, data mining techniques can be 
used to derive personal information about tenants.  For example, the Google Corporation 
offers multiple cloud services and has access to a plethora of data (Chow et al., 2009).  Some 
have described cloud computing as being similar to a utility.  However, unlike a utility, such 
as electricity, where an attacker is not interested in accessing a specific electron, an attacker 
may be interested in the data stored and transferred into a cloud computing environment.   
In addition, ownership of data should be understood when considering moving 
sensitive data to cloud environments.  Does the cloud provider own the data?  Does the 
organization placing the data into the environment own the data?  Or, if the tenant is running 
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an application in a cloud environment that contains tenant customer data, does the customer 
with data stored in a data record own the data (Katzan, 2010)?  In some cloud computing 
environments, a fundamental right to privacy is expected.  However, techniques such as 
anonymous authentication make it difficult or impossible to track the real user if a transaction 
is disputed (Lu, Lin, Liang, & Shen, 2010).    
 
Regulatory Compliance 
Regulatory compliance encompasses the issues around meeting the regulatory needs 
of an organization (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  Careful measures must be in 
place to comply with government regulations and industry standards, such as FFIEC (Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council), HIPPA (Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act), and PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards)  
(Katzan, 2010).  Many of these controls must be incorporated into the environment by the 
cloud provider and not the tenant.  Concerns around controls, such as encryption, must be 
taken into account when assessing the compliance related risks in these environments.  
Questions, such as whether the cloud provider has passed a SAS-70 audit, should be asked 
(Messmer, 2009).  Transparency is especially important for regulatory reasons (Chow, et al., 
2009).   
In addition, from the enforcement side, the definition of what constitutes compliance 
will not be fully clear until judges and regulators have a better track record and case history to 
dictate what is expected and reasonable (Ericson, 2009).   
 
Reputation Fate Sharing 
Cloud computing is a shared environment.  Hence, if not properly managed, one bad 
actor in the cloud environment may have a negative impact on other tenants.  For example, if 
one tenant is compromised and IP addresses become black listed, other consumers of the 
cloud may be impacted by no fault of their own (Armbrust, et al., 2010).  A tenant running a 
critical application for customers in a cloud environment may become unavailable.  
Unfortunately, the customers of that tenant will likely fault the tenant and not the cloud 
provider.   
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Restricted Access 
Restricted access refers to allowing only those who should be permitted to access data 
to actually have access to the data.  An organization that is placing data in a cloud computing 
environment must be certain that the cloud provider has competent and honest administrators 
who have put appropriate access controls in place (Barnes, 2010; Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  In 
addition, proper network security measures are needed to ensure only appropriately 
authorized users can access systems, applications, and network data in these shared 
environments (Kaufman, 2009).   
 
Security Controls 
Different cloud providers have differing levels of security controls in place.  One 
provider may have a well-established and respected information security program with 
controls and monitoring in place while another provider may not.  It is important to 
understand the security controls and the security postures of cloud providers before placing 
trust in their environment (Kaufman, 2009).    
A cloud environment is only as secure as its weakest link.  The multi-tenant nature of 
cloud environments make for prime targets of cybercriminals.   The movement towards 
increased hosting of data and applications in the cloud and less reliance on user machines for 
storing private data is likely to increase the threat of phishing and other attacks targeted at 
stealing access credentials (Chow, et al., 2009). 
 
Trust and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
Data that is moved into the cloud is under control of a third party provider.  Access to 
that data is in the hands of that cloud provider.  A concise service level agreement between 
the tenant and cloud provider must be in place in order to reduce risks especially with regard 
to availability.  The cloud provider must be trusted to deliver on the commitments in the SLA 
(Ramgovind, et al., 2010).  Service Level Agreements are a key component to defend against 
cybercrime and must evolve to counter dynamic attacks from cybercriminals.  These 
agreements must be well written and monitored (Biggs & Vidalis, 2010).   
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In addition to a standard SLA, a Sec-SLA which is a formally negotiated document 
that defines security metrics for a cloud computing environment may be considered.  
However, for a Sec-SLA to provide value, it must be monitored and enforced which requires 
buy-in from the cloud provider (de Chaves, Westphall, & Lamin, 2010).   
 
Trusted Interfaces 
Cloud computing is primarily managed through network connections.  Public clouds 
are managed through the Internet and proper controls are needed to ensure the interface is 
secure (Chang-Lung, et al., 2010).  It is critical that interfaces are secure and encryption 
protocols, such as TLS, are up to date to ensure known vulnerabilities are not used to exploit 
weaknesses. 
 
 
There are a vast number of security-related issues to be considered before an 
organization moves its application and data into a cloud computing environment.  Some of 
these challenges present interesting research topics to be explored and solved.   The cloud 
computing paradigm introduces new concerns that must be addressed in order to achieve high 
levels of adoption for all types of applications and data.  Depending on an organization’s 
security needs, regulatory compliance requirements, and customer demands, the issues 
summarized in this chapter should be considered before moving applications and data into a 
cloud computing infrastructure.   
Cloud computing certainly has a number of advantages over self-managed data centers 
and applications.  There is potential for reduced hardware and operating costs along with the 
ability to scale on demand.  However, it is clear, security challenges are prevalent in these 
environments.  Organizations considering moving applications and data into a cloud 
computing environment must assess the risks and ensure that proper controls and mitigation 
plans are in place to achieve an acceptable risk level.  Although risks can be mitigated, in 
order for cloud computing to thrive to its full potential, more of the security challenges must 
be addressed (Lu, et al., 2010). 
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Summary 
In this chapter, we provided a history and definition for cloud computing.  In addition, 
we presented our findings from a general literature review on cloud computing security 
challenges.  The driving force behind our research is to address a subset of these challenges.  
More specifically, as mentioned in chapter one, our primary research is focused on the 
instantiation of new security artifacts for cloud environments to improve the overall security 
posture while preserving tenant privacy with the goal to increase adoption of IaaS cloud 
computing environments.  Chapter three examines the research methodology we follow while 
conducting our work. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The information systems discipline studies people, organizations, and technology 
(Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004).  Generally, there are two paradigms used to conduct 
this research:  behavioral science and design science.  Behavioral science is descriptive in 
nature and attempts to explain phenomena related to information technology.  On the other 
hand,  design science is prescriptive by definition and aims to improve the performance and 
the results gained from using information technology (March & Smith, 1995).  Both 
approaches are used by researchers in the information systems discipline and are 
complimentary in nature.  In this chapter, we briefly examine the design science research 
methodology.  Then, we discuss the design science research approach that we follow while 
conducting our research.     
Design Science Research 
The goal of design science research is to create a means to achieve or better achieve 
human goals.  This differentiates the methodology from other methodologies, especially those 
used in the natural sciences which attempt to explain natural phenomenon but not create them.  
Design research may be evaluated and improved upon through research activities where the 
researcher executes a build and evaluate process.  The build and evaluate research steps may 
be followed by theorizing and justification steps which are the activities similar to those found 
in the natural sciences.  First, during the build phase, the artifact is constructed.  Second, the 
evaluate step consists of evaluating the artifact’s performance against a set of criteria.  Third, 
the theorizing phase attempts to explain the interactions with the artifact and the environments 
as well as its characteristics.  If theories are posited, they must be justified with evidence in 
order to test the theory (March & Smith, 1995).   
According to March and Smith, the outputs from design science include four 
categories, which are also termed artifacts.  They include constructs, models, methods, and 
implementations.  Constructs define the language of the concepts in the domain.  Models can 
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conceptualize constructs in order to describe tasks, circumstances, or artifacts.  Methods can 
be described as the steps for accomplishing activities.  And, finally, implementations are the 
instantiated product (March & Smith, 1995). 
Hevner, et al. posit seven guidelines for design research (2004).  These guidelines can 
be used by researchers to develop quality design research which contributes artifacts to the 
information systems (IS) knowledge base.   Unlike the natural sciences which examine, 
understand, and predict phenomena that occur in nature, design science is concerned with the 
study of the artificial and manmade objects.  Hevner, et al. suggest that there are five outputs 
from design research:  constructs, models, methods, instantiations, and better theories.  
Furthermore, the general methodology of design research consists of five process steps:  
awareness of problem, suggestion, development, evaluation, and conclusion (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2004/5).    
Design research is a critical component for the IS discipline for the simple fact that the 
entire discipline of information systems studies artifacts that have been designed by humans 
to accomplish the goals of humans (March & Smith, 1995).  Some argue that the relevance of 
information systems is directly related to how research can be applied to design.  Figure 3, 
below, depicts an information systems research framework posited by Hevner, et al.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Information Systems Research Framework (Hevner, et al., 2004) 
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Figure 3 illustrates how business needs and applicable knowledge results in new theories 
and artifacts.  From a design research perspective, new artifacts are developed, refined and then 
both pragmatic and scholarly contributions are made resulting in both relevant and rigorous 
research.   
The goal of information systems research is to explore the intersection of people, 
organizations, and technology (Silver, Markus, & Beath, 1995).  While the behavioral science 
aspect of information systems is reactive, design research is proactive and attempts to bring into 
being new artifacts to solve problems that have utility (Hevner, et al., 2004).   Design science 
research extends the state-of-the-art in the information systems domain by expanding the 
boundaries of known applications of information technology and by exploring problems that 
may have not been thought but could be approached using technology (March & Storey, 2008). 
Our Approach to Design Science Research 
The aim of our research is to bring new relevant cloud computing security artifacts 
into being.  In order to ensure research rigor and differentiate our work from design by 
production, we follow the Peffers, et al. design science research methodology process model 
shown in Figure 4 (2007).   
 
Figure 4.  Design Science Research Methodology Process Model 
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Our approach begins by identifying the problem and motivation behind the problem 
by conducting a general literature review of open problems in IaaS cloud computing security.  
Based on the literature review, we find gaps in security controls used within cloud computing 
environments.  First, our work identifies specific security control gaps within Infrastructure as 
a Service (IaaS) Public Cloud Computing environments which are used to develop the 
motivation behind our work.  The output of the literature review leads us down three areas of 
research:  a new security control to detect attacks at the hypervisor level, a novel system for 
managing and acting upon security control alerts, and an approach and artifact for detecting 
insider data theft.  Second, we define the objectives of our multi-part solution.  Third, we 
design and develop artifacts that address the objectives of our research.  Fourth, we 
demonstrate the effectiveness of our artifacts.  Fifth and sixth, we evaluate the effectiveness 
of our artifacts and system through experimentation and communicate our work to 
professional and scholarly communities through publications.  Each of these phases are 
discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed the design science research methodology and our 
approach to applying this methodology to our work.  Chapter four provides an overview of 
our system which is composed of the artifacts derived from our research.  Furthermore, a 
mapping of each component to the Peffers, et al. Design Science Research Methodology is 
discussed along with how our work generally fits within this methodology. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH COMPONENTS AND SYSTEM 
Following the design science research methodology, we contribute to the information 
systems and computing knowledge base by bringing new artifacts into being.  These 
components are derived following the Peffers, et al. Design Science Research Methodology as 
mentioned in chapter three.  In order to better understand the relevance of our work, it is 
important to view each research artifact as a component in a larger system.  In this chapter, 
first, we introduce each of the research components.  Second, we discuss how the components 
fit into an overall system.  And, third, we elaborate on the methodology used to construct the 
artifacts and provide a mapping to information systems design science research concepts. 
Research Components 
The aim of our research is to address three security challenges in Infrastructure as a 
Service cloud computing environments.  First, we derive a new approach for detecting 
potential bad actors in the cloud environment by analyzing anomalies in hypervisor 
performance data.  This approach provides a level of privacy for the cloud tenants while 
offering an additional security control to improve bad actor detection and thwart cloud 
attacks.  Second, we research and develop a methodology and system for reducing the number 
of alert messages from security controls in a cloud environment.  A defense in depth approach 
is recommended for securing IT infrastructures.  However, managing security controls across 
a vast number of systems can be a challenging task and ineffective if the appropriate alerts are 
not properly acted upon.  Third, our research examines the problem of data theft and insider 
attacks in cloud environments.  Cloud providers generally house multiple tenants who may 
place sensitive assets into these environments.  It is crucial that the providers not only operate 
and manage controls to prevent outside attacks, but also attacks from within.  In cloud 
environments, insider attacks may occur from actors employed by the cloud provider as well 
as ill-intentioned tenants wishing to steal data or other assets. 
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IaaS Cloud Security System 
The three components of our research make up an overall system for enhancing the 
security of IaaS cloud computing environments, and include a Hypervisor-based Cloud 
Intrusion Detection System (HCIDS), a Streaming Intrusion Monitoring and Classification 
System for IaaS Cloud (SCIMCS), and a System for Detecting Malicious Insider Data Theft 
in IaaS Cloud Environments.  Figure 5, below, illustrates how the individual components of 
our research work together to make up our distributed multi-component approach and system 
for enhanced security of public infrastructure as a service (IaaS) cloud computing 
environments. 
 
 
Figure 5.  System Perspective of Research Components 
Agents are installed in the cloud environment on the physical nodes that house tenant 
virtual machines.  These agents collect network and system data from various sources and 
feed that data into the components of our system.  More specifically, first, the Hypervisor-
based Cloud Intrusion Detection System receives metric data from the hypervisors which 
control the tenant virtual machines.  These metrics are used to detect anomalous behavior, 
then compare the anomalous patterns with known attack patterns and classify attacks.  
Second, the Streaming Intrusion Monitoring and Classification System for IaaS Cloud ingests 
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message alerts from security sensors in the cloud environment, including alerts from the other 
two research components.  This system presents potential Black Swan events to the security 
administrator to help assist with triaging high priority events first.  In addition, when trained, 
the system displays the type of attack based on previously observed patterns.  Third, the 
System for Detecting Malicious Insider Data Theft in IaaS Cloud Environments examines 
login activity and data transfers on the physical node.  Abnormal patterns in these two events 
coupled with system state data are shown to detect potential insider data theft in cloud 
environments with a high level of accuracy. 
While each component contributes to the knowledge base, the combination of these 
three components makes up a system that provides a new set of security controls to improve 
the security posture of IaaS cloud computing environments.  Future chapters in this 
dissertation reveal the detailed research and results for each component. 
Research Methodology and Research Rigor 
 As discussed in chapter three, our research is accomplished using the design science 
research methodology.  More specifically, we follow the Peffers, et al. Design Science 
Research Methodology to ensure research rigor.  Table 1, summarizes the mapping of our 
research to the model.  
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Table 1.  Design Science Methodology Component Mapping 
Peffers, et al., Design 
Science Research 
Methodology Step 
Chapter 5:  Hypervisor-
based Cloud Intrusion 
Detection System 
(HCIDS)  
Chapter 6:  Streaming 
Intrusion Monitoring 
and Classification 
System (SCIMCS) 
 
Chapter 7:  System 
for Detecting 
Malicious Insider 
Data Theft  
Identify Problem and 
Motivate 
A gap exists between 
protecting the cloud users 
from outsider attacks using 
perimeter security 
approaches and attacks from 
mischievous users who have 
penetrated the perimeter 
security controls. 
A need to improve the 
monitoring of security 
system alerts and more 
importantly knowing 
which events to act upon 
immediately exists within 
cloud environments. 
New security controls are 
needed to detect and 
prevent insider data theft.  
This is especially true in 
multi-tenant cloud 
environments. 
Define Objectives of a 
Solution 
The creation of a hypervisor-
based intrusion detection 
system for cloud 
environments. 
The creation of a system 
and approach to assist 
administrators with 
gaining a better 
understanding of 
important events and 
classification of such 
events. 
The creation of a new 
approach and system for 
detecting insider data 
theft. 
Design & Develop The system is designed and 
developed using libvirt, 
Python, and IBM Streams. 
The system consists of 
three steps: 1) Summarize 
and Score, 2) Detect 
Anomalies, and 3) 
Classify Attacks and is 
developed using Python 
and IBM Streams. 
A system profiling 
approach is used for 
detecting abnormal login 
activity and data transfers 
from IaaS cloud 
computing nodes hosting 
tenant virtual machines 
using Python and IBM 
Streams. 
Demonstration We demonstrate and verify 
the effectiveness of the 
proposed system in a small 
cloud environment using the 
Eucalyptus infrastructure. 
We demonstrate and 
verify the effectiveness of 
the proposed system in a 
small cloud environment 
using the Eucalyptus 
infrastructure. 
We demonstrate and 
verify the effectiveness of 
the proposed system in a 
small cloud environment 
using the Eucalyptus 
infrastructure. 
Evaluation Using developed signatures, 
we are able to detect 100 
percent of two types of 
denial of service attacks 
within a cloud environment: 
denial of service attacks 
against a cloud instance and 
a denial of service attacks 
from a cloud instance against 
another cloud instance. 
We observe a total alert 
reduction of 95.9 percent 
with a zero miss rate for 
problematic alarms. In 
addition, we demonstrate 
a 100 percent 
classification rate for 
trained attacks. 
We observe 100 percent 
detection of abnormal 
login activity and data 
copies to outside systems 
and a zero false positive 
detection rate when 
anomalies in active user 
counts and bytes 
transmitted is detected 
along with supporting 
system state data. 
Communication IEEE International 
Conference on Computing, 
Networking and 
Communication (ICNC), 
CNC Workshop, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, USA, Feb 3-6, 2014. 
IEEE International 
Conference on Cloud 
Computing (CLOUD), 
San Francisco, USA, June 
27 - July 2, 2016. 
IEEE Global 
Communications 
Conference 
(GLOBECOM), 
December 4-8 December, 
2016. 
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In accordance with the Hevner, et al. research framework, each component in our 
system contributes relevant work to the cloud computing environment along with rigorous 
design science research to the knowledge base.  Table 2 summarizes the contributions of our 
work according to the Hevner, et al framework. 
 
Table 2.  Hevner, et al. Research Framework Mapping 
Artifact Application in the 
Appropriate Environment 
Addition to the Knowledge 
Base 
Hypervisor-based Cloud 
Intrusion Detection System 
Technology: Infrastructure 
Technology: Applications 
Foundations: Methods 
Foundations:  Instantiations 
SCIMCS Technology: Infrastructure 
Technology: Applications 
Foundations: Methods 
Foundations:  Instantiations 
Insider Data Theft Detector Technology: Infrastructure 
Technology: Applications 
Foundations: Methods 
Foundations:  Instantiations 
 
Each artifact of the overall system contributes to IaaS cloud computing infrastructure 
security through instantiation and demonstration of novel security components that reduce 
cloud deployment risk by improving security in these environments.  Additionally, the 
research introduces new methods for detecting attacks and better understanding alerts in these 
environments.  
Summary 
In chapter four, we introduced each of our research components and discussed how the 
components fit into an overall system.  Then, we elaborated on the methodology used to 
construct the artifacts and provided a mapping to information systems design science research 
concepts.  Chapters five, six, and seven provide the details for each of the research 
components.  
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CHAPTER 5 
HYPERVISOR-BASED CLOUD INTRUSION 
DETECTION SYSTEM  
One of the significant challenges in Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud computing 
is the lack of ability for cloud users to control security protection in the cloud infrastructure. 
In a survey of more than 170 businesses, 50 percent of the respondents stated concerns with 
security issues relating to cloud computing resources (Biggs & Vidalis, 2009). To help 
address these concerns, controls have been proposed by the Cloud Security Alliance, many of 
which are process based and are subject to noncompliance and human error. For the controls 
that are automated and machine based, a gap exists between protecting the cloud users from 
outsider attacks using perimeter security approaches and attacks from mischievous users who 
have penetrated the perimeter security controls. These outside attackers become insiders 
within the cloud environment and can attack other virtual machines within the cloud 
infrastructure.  
One automated security control recommended by the Cloud Security Alliance for 
cloud computing environments is an intrusion detection system (Cloud Security Alliance, 
2011). There are two traditional types of intrusion detection systems: host based and network 
intrusion detection systems (Dhage & Meshram, 2012).  Host based intrusion detection 
systems are composed of an agent on a host system that examines system calls, logs, file-
system modifications, and other host activities to detect intrusions. Network intrusion 
detection systems monitor network traffic and the content of packets in order to discover 
malicious traffic.  
Both host based and network based intrusion detection systems have advantages and 
limitations. Network intrusion detection systems attempt to address attacks from outsiders and 
generally have limited effectiveness against insider attacks (M. B. Salem, Hershkop, & Stolfo, 
2008). These and other perimeter security controls, such as firewalls, may be less effective in 
cloud computing environments because of the shared multi-tenancy nature of cloud 
computing (Sheridan & Cooper, 2012). It is common for multiple cloud users to reside 
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virtually partitioned on a single physical machine which opens up the possibility for attacks 
over virtual or internal networks (Lori, 2010).  Host based intrusion detection systems can be 
effective but typically must be monitored and managed by cloud users. This approach can be 
difficult for cloud users who have several instances in a cloud environment. Furthermore, host 
based intrusion detection systems can be disabled by a skilled attacker that has breached the 
instance.  
In this chapter, we propose a new type of intrusion detection system, a Hypervisor-
based Cloud Intrusion Detection System (HCIDS), to address some of the challenges with 
traditional intrusion detection systems in cloud environments. HCIDS examines system 
metrics for cloud instances directly from the hypervisor to seek out potential misuse patterns. 
Our contributions in this work include, but are not limited to:  
 We propose a hypervisor-based intrusion detection system for cloud environments. 
 We demonstrate and verify the effectiveness of the proposed system in a real cloud 
environment.  
 Using developed signatures, we are able to detect 100 percent of two types of denial of 
service attacks within a cloud environment: denial of service attacks against a cloud 
instance and a denial of service attacks from a cloud instance against another cloud 
instance.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  First, related work is discussed. 
Second, the system design of our hypervisor-based cloud intrusion detection system is 
presented.  Third, the system is demonstrated and results are discussed.  Fourth, our work is 
summarized and we discuss future works. 
Related Work 
Our work consists of three components: the use of performance signatures for 
detecting attacks on a system, detecting anomalies in virtualized environments from outside of 
the virtual machine, and an intrusion detection framework for cloud environments.   
The use of performance signatures to detect malicious activity and intrusions is 
proposed by Avritzer, et. al and Oppenheimer and Martonosi (Avritzer, Tanikella, James, 
Cole, & Weyuker, 2010; Oppenheimer & Martonosi, 1997).  Oppenheimer and Martonosi 
present a model for using performance signature data to detect system security violations.  
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More recently, Avritzer, Cole, and Weyuker demonstrate an approach for detecting attacks on 
software systems using system performance signatures.  In their work, they model the 
performance characteristics of a system with a reasonable background load to simulate system 
usage and examine CPU, memory, I/O and network usage metrics to detect buffer overflow, 
stack overflow, SQL injection, denial of service (DoS), and man-in-the-middle attacks. The 
results from their work show promise for using performance signatures to profile attacks.   
An approach for detecting attacks in a virtualized environment outside of the virtual 
machine instance is to use virtual machine monitor introspection (Christodorescu, Sailer, 
Schales, Sgandurra, & Zamboni, 2009). Garkinkel and Rosenblum present an architecture and 
prototype using virtual machine introspection to detect attacks in virtual machine instances 
(Garfinkel & Rosenblum, 2003).  In their work, they demonstrate how introspection of the 
virtual machine can detect rootkits and backdoors, Trojan horses, packet sniffers, and worms 
by inferring software state based on a priori knowledge of its structure.   
Cloud computing intrusion detection is an active research area.  To address 
performance issues with intrusion detection in a cloud computing environment, Dhage, et al 
propose a distributed intrusion detection system which averts heavy loads on a central 
intrusion detection server (Dhage & Meshram, 2012).  Their work places multiple mini 
intrusion detection instances throughout the cloud environment which communicate with a 
controller.  The controller stores pertinent data in cloud logs and uses it for intrusion detection 
analysis.  To enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of network intrusion detection systems, 
Lin, et al. present a technique for using hypervisors in the cloud to inventory operating 
systems and services on nodes (Lin, 2009).  Larger security solutions are also suggested such 
as the Security Audit as a Service architecture for cloud computing environments posited by 
Doelitzscher, et. al (Doelitzscher, Reich, & Sulistio, 2010).  Their six-layer security model 
utilizes modules, including a crypto module, a customer public key infrastructure, an SLA 
monitoring system, a policy module, a logging module, and an intrusion detection system. 
Design and Development 
Hypervisors have access to performance data for the virtual machines that they host.  
This data provides insight into the activities occurring within a virtual machine without 
having direct knowledge of the actual operating system, applications or private data residing 
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within the virtual machine.  In our proposed Hypervisor-based Cloud Intrusion Detection 
System (HCIDS), we utilize performance metrics from hypervisors within a cloud 
environment to detect attack patterns.  This approach differs from other performance based 
intrusion detection systems in that it removes the requirement of having software installed on 
the host computer, or virtual machine in a virtualized cloud environment.  Forcing cloud 
computing users to install additional software in their instances can be problematic and may 
be resisted by cloud users.  Furthermore, gathering performance metrics directly from the 
hypervisor and not from the operating system makes our solution operating system agnostic. 
Using patterns in streaming performance metrics from the hypervisor, we are able to detect 
and classify abnormal usage. 
 
Performance Metrics 
The performance metrics used in our work are retrieved from the hypervisors hosting 
virtual machines within the cloud computing environment.  Performance metric data for 
network data transmitted, network data received, block device read data, block device write 
data, and CPU utilization is analyzed and is commonly available from all the major 
virtualization platforms using application programming interfaces (APIs).  Our approach 
retrieves each of these metrics every second.  We do not analyze memory utilization because 
memory allocation is performed once at startup and does not vary with usage making it 
irrelevant for detecting attacks. 
 
Framework 
Our proposed framework consists of three high level components: a controller node, 
end point nodes, and a notification service. First, the controller node is responsible for near 
real time analysis of performance data for every virtual machine in the cloud computing 
environment.  Second, the end point nodes gather data on every virtual machine running in the 
cloud environment from the virtual machine hypervisor and present the data to the controller 
node.  Third, the notification service provides notification when an attack signature has been 
identified.  Figure 6 illustrates our proposed design architecture. 
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Figure 6.  Conceptual Diagram of Proposed System 
 
Controller Node 
The controller node is a service that resides within the cloud environment.  Its purpose 
is to collect and analyze data in near real time from the end point nodes.  As data arrives, it is 
analyzed using a sliding window approach.  Windows of performance metrics are analyzed 
for signatures that suggest suspicious activity. 
 
Endpoint Nodes 
Endpoint nodes are a conceptual component.  They may be agents on each physical 
system that contains a hypervisor, built within a hypervisor, or API calls to the hypervisor.  
The purpose of these nodes is to gather and format data from hypervisors and send it to the 
controller node for analysis.  These nodes reside outside of virtual machines and cannot be 
controlled or manipulated by cloud computing users. 
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Notification Service 
The notification service is used to provide alerts that the system has detected a 
signature of a potential attack.  The notification can be a message in a log file, an email, or 
input into another intrusion detection system. 
Demonstration and Evaluation 
We demonstrate the feasibility of using hypervisor performance metrics to detect 
attacks on virtual machines in a cloud computing environment using the Eucalyptus 
infrastructure.  Eucalyptus is a private and hybrid cloud solution that is in use by a number of 
large organizations. 
 
Eucalyptus Test Environment 
The Eucalyptus cloud computing system is composed of five main components: cloud 
controller, Walrus, cluster controller, storage controller, and one or more node controllers 
(“Eucalyptus Components,” 2013).  In our test cloud environment, the cloud controller, 
Walrus server, cluster controller and storage controller all reside on a single physical server.  
Furthermore, our environment consists of two node controllers which reside on independent 
physical machines.  Table 3 summarizes the hardware configuration of our test environment. 
 
Table 3.  Simulated Cloud Environment Specification 
Component Configuration 
Controller AMD Athon™ 64x2 Dual Core Processor 
4 GB RAM 
Two gigabit network interface cards (NICs) 
Endpoint 1 AMD Phenom™ II X4 965 Quad Core Processor 
8 GB RAM 
Two gigabit network interface cards (NICs) 
Endpoint 2 AMD Phenom™ 9150e Quad Core Processor 
6 GB RAM 
Two gigabit network interface cards (NICs) 
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Simulation Implementation Detail 
 This section describes the components of our system.  First, the controller node is 
explained.  Second, the endpoint nodes are examined.  And, third, the notification service is 
discussed.  Figure 7 illustrates the implementation detail and flow between components. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Implementation Detail 
 
Controller Node 
The controller node resides on a machine outside of the Eucalyptus infrastructure and 
is prototyped using the IBM Streams product.  The controller node logic is implemented using 
IBM Streams Processing Language (SPL) (Zikopoulos & Eaton, 2011) and listens on a UDP 
socket.  Hypervisor performance data is rapidly ingested and analyzed using two sets of 
sliding windows.  First, ten second sliding windows aggregate data on CPU percent 
utilization, block device reads, block device writes, network packets received, and network 
packets transmitted.  As metric values enter sliding windows, the mean and maximum values 
are calculated.  Anomalies are defined as values that exceed two times the mean.  Second, a 
three second sliding window is used to detect attacks.  This window populates with anomalies 
detected from the first sliding window.  If an anomaly occurs three times, consecutively, it is 
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labeled as a potential attack pattern and compared to a set of known attack patterns.  
Unrecognized patterns are ignored. 
 
Endpoint Nodes 
Two Eucalyptus nodes are used which contain multiple virtual machines.  A Python 
script gathers CPU, block device, and network device metrics using the libvirt API and is 
deployed on each node.  This script samples performance metrics every second and sends the 
data in comma separated value (csv) format to the Controller Node using the UDP protocol 
for each virtual machine running on the node. 
 
Notification Service 
The IBM Streams product performs the role of the notification service. The attacks are 
visualized in a table and written to a file.  The file can be monitored using any common file 
monitoring tool. 
 
Simulated Activities 
The effectiveness of the system is demonstrated by running denial of service attacks 
from and against a virtual machine in the cloud environment with and without a simulated 
valid user workload. 
 
Simulated Workload 
An Apache web server resides on the cloud instance which serves up a web page that 
randomly performs different sized reads and writes at intervals of two and five seconds.  For 
each simulated activity, three runs are conducted three times.  The first run is performed 
without a user workload.  The second run is conducted with five concurrent users accessing 
the cloud instance’s HTTP server webpage.  And, the third run is performed with 10 users 
concurrently accessing the cloud instance’s HTTP server webpage. 
 
Simulated Attacks 
Two types of denial of service (DoS) attacks are performed to examine the 
effectiveness of our approach: a HTTP flood attack against a cloud instance and a syn flood 
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attack from the cloud instance against another virtual machine in the cloud environment.  
First, a denial of service attack against the cloud instance is performed using the tool 
DoSHTTP (“Socketsoft.net,” 2013) from outside the cloud environment using a Windows 7 
machine.  This attack uses 500 sockets to issue 10,000 requests.  Second, hping3 (Sanfilippo, 
2013) is used to create a syn flood attack from within the virtual machine to attack another 
virtual machine in the cloud. 
 
Attack analysis approach 
The primary purpose of our analysis is to determine whether hypervisor performance 
metrics can be used to detect and classify attacks while minimally flagging normal usage as 
attacks.  We do this by manually observing patterns in performance data when DoS attacks 
are occurring and creating signatures from these patterns.  There are three goals for the attack 
signatures.  The first goal is to reduce or eliminate false positives.  A false positive occurs 
when normal usage is labeled as an attack.  An intrusion detection system with a high false 
positive rate will be ignored or disabled.  The second goal is to detect all valid attacks.  The 
more attacks not detected, the less effective the system becomes.  And, the third goal is to 
properly classify the type of an attack.  Proper classification is useful for responding to 
attacks.   
With these goals in mind, we perform both DoS attacks three times for approximately 
15 minutes under three stress conditions: no users, five concurrent users, and a load of 10 
concurrent users.  The variability in workload improves the quality of the experimentation by 
better reflecting a real world cloud application.  Furthermore, each run is performed three 
times to examine the repeatability of results.   
We manually observe repeatable anomaly patterns in the hypervisor performance 
metrics while the attacks occur and create signatures for the attacks.  Each signature is 
composed of five commonly available hypervisor metric variables:  Packets Transmitted 
(Packets TX), Packets Received (Packets RX), Block Device Read Requests (Block Device 
Read Req), Block Device Write Request (Block Device Write Req), and CPU Utilization 
(CPU Util.)   
A signature is defined by Boolean values for each performance metric.  A metric is 
considered true in a signature if it is repeatedly detected as an anomaly for three consecutive 
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10 second sliding windows.  As previously described, an anomaly is defined as a metric value 
exceeding twice the mean in a 10 second sliding window.  We find that this technique reduces 
false positives caused by normal system variability.  Using this approach, we code patterns for 
the DoS attacks from and against a cloud instance.  The patterns represent the signature for an 
attack.   
The system is applied to normal running conditions without attacks in order to 
measure false positives.  The same three system stress conditions (e.g., no user activity, five 
concurrent users, and 15 concurrent users) are performed and the results are recorded. 
 
Results and Observations 
The coding of performance metrics reveals repeatable signature patterns for the two 
DoS attacks.  Table 4 summarizes the attack signatures derived from manual observations 
during multiple system runs under the three stress conditions. 
 
Table 4.  Signatures 
Attack CPU 
Utilization 
Block 
Device Read 
Request 
Block 
Device 
Write 
Request 
Packets 
Received  
Packets 
Transmitted 
HTTP DoS 
attack 
against cloud 
instance 
True False False True True 
Syn Flood 
attack from 
cloud 
instance 
True False Any False True 
 
To measure the accuracy of signatures, three test runs are performed: DoS attack 
against the instance, DoS attack from the instance, and no attack for a baseline measurement.  
Each test run is conducted over a 45 minute period consisting of three 15 minute stress 
conditions: no user activity, five concurrent users, and 10 concurrent users.  Attacks are issued 
three times during each stress condition, or nine times total per test run.  Table 5 summarizes 
the results of our findings. 
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Table 5.  Accuracy 
Attack False Positives 
(number of false 
positives / number of 
metric sets analyzed 
that were not 
attacks) 
False Negatives 
(number of attacks 
not detected / 
number of attacks 
issued) 
Misclassifications 
(number of attacks 
incorrectly classified 
/ number of attacks 
issued) 
 
HTTP DoS attack 
against cloud 
instance 
<1% (8/3043) 0% (0/9) 0% (0/9) 
Syn Flood attack 
from cloud instance 
1.4% (43/3179) 0% (0/9) 0% (0/9) 
No attack 0% (0/3091) N/A N/A 
 
A false positive is counted when a set of performance metric data is detected as an 
attack during normal usage.  A false negative is defined as an attack that is not detected.  And, 
misclassifications are attacks that are incorrectly classified as other attacks (e.g., a syn flood 
attack is classified as a HTTP DoS attack.)   
The data from our findings indicate that streaming hypervisor performance metrics can 
be used to detect denial of service attacks within a cloud environment.  Every denial of 
service attack performed by the instance and against the instance is detected and properly 
classified.  The false positives are mostly detected during the 10 user workload run.  We 
theorize that this workload may emulate a denial of service attack in the environment.  
Additional investigation is needed to prevent these false positives.  Also, it is noteworthy that 
no false positives are detected when an attack is not applied. 
 
Comparison with other approaches 
The work presented in Avritzer et al (2010) and Oppenheimer & Martonosi (1997) 
uses a host-based intrusion detection approach to run a monitoring agent on a computer to 
retrieve performance metrics from the operating system or applications.  Our proposed 
approach does not require any additional software installed in virtual machines.  In 
Christodorescu et al. (2009) and Garfinkel & Rosenblum (2003), virtual machine 
introspection is used.  Virtual machine introspection is effective to detect malicious behavior 
in virtual machines.  However, it examines the detailed state of the virtual machine such as 
memory and register contents and I/O device flags.  Cloud users storing confidential data on a 
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cloud instance may have concerns with the snooping of memory on their virtual machines.  
Further, it also requires knowledge and modification of the underlying operating system.  Our 
approach does not require direct knowledge of the operating system running in virtual 
machines.  We examine the performance metric usage patterns over time.  The work in Dhage 
& Meshram (2012), Doelitzscher et al. (2010), and Lin (2009) uses distributed intrusion 
detection system which averts heavy loads on a central intrusion detection server.  In our 
work, an agent is installed on each hypervisor node which communicates with a central 
decision node.   
HCIDS offers at least two advantages over existing intrusion detection techniques.  
First, monitoring is done outside of the virtual machine and is independent of the operating 
system or applications running within the virtual machines.  This removes the burden of users 
having to install additional software in their images and cannot be compromised from within 
the virtual machine instance.  Second, insider attacks that potentially would not be detected 
using perimeter security controls can be detected.  If an attacker takes over an instance and 
then uses that instance to attack other instances in the cloud computing environment, 
perimeter firewalls and intrusion detection systems generally would not detect this malicious 
activity. 
Conclusion and Future Work 
The initial findings from this work indicate that hypervisor performance signatures can 
indeed be successfully used to detect attacks in a cloud computing environment.  This 
approach offers advantages over other intrusion detection systems alone.  First, our 
framework does not require knowledge of the underlying operating system or applications run 
on cloud instances.  We examine patterns of performance metrics from outside of the instance 
directly from the hypervisor without placing a burden on the cloud user.  Second, the 
proposed hypervisor-based cloud intrusion detection system can be integrated with and 
complement existing intrusion detection systems and perimeter defenses to improve the 
security within cloud environments.  When using a defense in depth security strategy, 
multiple security systems should be considered to detect and thwart attackers.   
Our experiments and testing demonstrate the feasibility of using hypervisor metrics for 
detecting denial of service attacks both against and from a cloud instance.  Additional 
37 
statistical approaches to extract attack patterns and system tuning will be explored next. 
Further attacks, including enumeration, insider password cracking, and network sniffing will 
be profiled to test the accuracy of detection and classification systems.  Approaches to reduce 
false positives will be examined.  And, a comparison analysis of traditional approaches and 
our system will be conducted. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A STREAMING INTRUSION MONITORING AND 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
A data breach reported on December 18, 2013 occurred against the Target 
Corporation.  It is believed that the bad actors captured 40 million payment card reports and 
70 million customer records.  The cause of this significant loss is believed to be the result of 
inadequate monitoring and alert response (Cobb, 2014).  Unfortunately, security attacks and 
breaches occur against organizations of all types and sizes.  Security professionals and 
researchers accept the premise that no system has perfect security (Mandiant, 2014).  
Furthermore, security challenges have been noted as primary reasons for avoiding adoption of 
cloud computing by organizations (Hay, Nance, Bishop, Brian, & Hay, 2011; Ren et al., 
2012).   
Cloud computing offers unique challenges over single tenant data centers.  More 
specifically, cloud computing infrastructure as a service (IaaS) environments generally consist 
of multiple tenants running a variety of applications with differing privacy and confidentiality 
requirements.  Although IaaS cloud environments introduce challenges above and beyond 
private data centers, the techniques for securing both environments are similar.  The Cloud 
Security Alliance suggests an approach that includes a defense in depth (SANS, 2001) 
strategy where people, process, and layers of technology all play a role in securing the cloud 
environment (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011).   
As observed from incidents such as the Target Corporation breach, monitoring 
intrusion detection system alerts and more importantly knowing which events to act upon 
immediately may be the difference between a minor breach and significant damage to an 
organization.  This challenge is amplified in a multi-tenant IaaS environment where multiple 
tenants may host sensitive data and run services that perform diverse computing activities.   
Our work supports a defense in depth approach by leveraging multiple distributed 
intrusion detection and security system sensors in an IaaS cloud computing environment.  We 
propose a streaming cloud intrusion monitoring and classification system (SCIMCS) to assist 
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cloud providers with multiple security systems by filtering noisy alert messages and 
classifying previously observed attacks.  
Our approach consists of three steps: 1) Summarize and Score, 2) Detect Anomalies, 
and 3) Classify Attacks.  In this chapter, we detail our approach and demonstrate its 
effectiveness through implementation and experimentation in an IaaS cloud environment 
using the Eucalyptus cloud framework.  We observe a total alert reduction of 95.9 percent 
with a zero miss rate for problematic alarms.  In addition, we demonstrate a 100 percent 
classification rate for trained attacks.  Our contributions from this work include, but are not 
limited to: 
 A weighted noisiness approach for alert prioritization and classification. 
 A framework for IaaS cloud environments using the proposed approach consisting of 
five components: Sensor Agents, Ingestor, Analyzer, Detector, and Classifier. 
 We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in an IaaS cloud environment 
using the Eucalyptus cloud infrastructure by executing and classifying real attacks.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  First, related work is discussed. 
Second, the system design of our streaming cloud intrusion monitoring and classification 
system is presented.  Third, the system is demonstrated and results are discussed.  Fourth, our 
work is summarized and we discuss future works. 
Related Work 
In this section, first, we summarize existent related work in four subcategories: alert 
aggregation, alert correlation, alert ranking and classification, as well as cloud based 
approaches.  Second, we summarize how our approach is novel.   
 
Alert Aggregation 
Debar and Wespi introduce a system using Tivoli Enterprise Console that aggregates 
and correlates data from probes.  Correlation relationships are created using explicit rules and 
derived rules from configuration information.  Aggregation relationships are created using an 
algorithm that groups events together using these rules.  They demonstrate the effectiveness 
of their solution and display the results using alert and alarm views (Debar & Wespi, 2001).  
Fan, Ye, and Deng demonstrate a distributed alert aggregation system model that uses a 
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transform agent to convert intrusion detection system (IDS) messages.  Original alerts are 
categorized into classes and actions which can be issued.  Their work is tested using network 
data (Fan, Jihua, & Mingxing, 2009).  Hofmann and Sick propose algorithms for alert 
aggregation based on probabilistic models of a current situation using alert attributes.  They 
provide both an offline and data stream alert aggregation approach (Hofmann & Sick, 2011).  
Saad and Traore present semantic analysis and ontology engineering techniques to aggregate 
and fuse intrusion detection system alerts.  Their work demonstrates an approach for lossless 
alert aggregation that does not require perfect matches of alert attributes (Saad & Traore, 
2011). 
 
Alert Correlation 
Valeur, et al. present a correlation process and framework for addressing large 
volumes of messages output from intrusion detection systems.  They use alerts from multiple 
systems and create intrusion reports or tag them as non-relevant.  Their approach uses alert ids 
and alert names to perform mapping and normalization (Valeur, Vigna, Kruegel, & 
Kemmerer, 2004).  Qin and Lee put forth an approach to analyze INFOSEC alerts and detect 
attack strategies.  In their work, Bayesian inference and the Granger Causality test is used to 
correlate alerts (Singhal, Qin, & Lee, 2007).  Ma, Li, and Zhang present an approach to fuse 
alerts based on timestamp and remove duplicates to reduce alerts.  Evidence threat probability 
is calculated using Dempster-Shafer theory.  Furthermore, they combine network and 
intrusion detection data and use Hidden Markov Models (HMM) to calculate a network risk 
distribution (Ma, Li, & Zhang, 2009).  Wen, Xian and Zhou introduce a system for alert 
fusion and correlation.  In their work, they use a target-oriented policy where alerts are 
clustered when requirements of duplication categorization and co-operating are met (Wen, 
Xiang, & Zhou, 2010). 
 
Alert Ranking and Classification 
Jiang, et al. present work on importance ranking of alerts using invariant relationships 
to map metric thresholds to other metric thresholds.  They use Autoregressive models to learn 
linear relationships between metrics.  And, they use alert peer review to assist with 
trustworthiness of alerts (Jiang, Chen, Yoshihira, & Saxena, 2011).  Gupta, et al. present the 
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PIKE architecture which uses a binary classifier to classify an alert as relevant or irrelevant 
based on knowledge-based evaluation.  They propose a classifier that uses a calculated score 
as the characteristic for classification.  The effectiveness is demonstrated using contextual 
information as a basis of IDS alert classification (Gupta, Joshi, Bhattacharjee, & Mundada, 
2012). 
 
Cloud Based Approaches 
The Cloud Security Alliance suggests an approach that includes a defense in depth 
strategy where people, process, and layers of technology all play a role in securing a cloud 
environment (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011).  Furthermore, NIST provides Guidelines on 
Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing in SP800-144 (Jansen & Grance, 2011).  
Both of these pragmatic works provide recommendations for securing a cloud environment 
but leave the specific details to cloud providers.   
Technical cloud solutions exist in literature.  Gul and Hussain present a cloud 
intrusion detection model.  They put forth a multi-threaded cloud intrusion detection system 
that monitors the network along with a third party monitoring system (Gul & Hussain, 2011).  
Log monitoring and management systems in cloud computing environments based on usage 
are also known (Lee, Park, Eom, & Chung, 2011).  And, collaborative intrusion detection 
systems in cloud environments have been posited (Mohamed, Adil, Saida, & Hicham, 2013). 
 
 
Our Approach 
Information overload theory has been applied to the field of advertising (Anderson & 
de Palma, 2005).  In marketing, the outcome of too much information is the reduced 
effectiveness of advertising investment.  Information overload theory can be applied to 
security control effectiveness.  Accuracy aside, the effectiveness of a security system 
dramatically decreases when an administrator is overwhelmed with too much information.   
We set out to reduce the information overload problem in IaaS cloud by 
accomplishing three objectives: 1) to present cloud providers with alerts of importance from 
multiple systems while filtering lesser important alarms without sensor reconfiguration, 2) to 
properly classify attacks based on filtered alerts, and 3) to present a scalable and dynamic 
approach.  We accomplish our objectives using a novel three step approach: 1) Summarize 
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and Score, 2) Detect Anomalies, and 3) Classify Attacks.  To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to examine alert prioritization and classification in IaaS Cloud Environments 
using anomalies in calculated urgency scores.  Using these reduced alerts, attacks are 
classified.  We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework by executing, detecting, and 
classifying real attacks.  Unlike previous works, we do not use simulation on test data sets, but 
actual system state and attacks. 
Design and Development 
An IaaS cloud environment typically consists of virtual machines hosted on physical 
nodes.  A single node may host virtual machine instances from multiple tenants.  To secure 
this shared dynamic environment, the Cloud Security Alliance recommends a defense in depth 
approach (Cloud Security Alliance, 2011).  Similarly, NIST provides security guidance for 
cloud providers (Jansen & Grance, 2011).  However, managing a defense in depth approach is 
non-trivial.  Several layers of security mechanisms must be deployed and monitored.  When a 
threat is detected, it must be appropriately acted upon.  A common problem with monitoring 
such approaches is the sheer volume of alarms generated, some of which are false positives, 
and others are informational.  It is challenging for cloud providers to quickly interpret which 
events to act upon and the priority of such events.  
Another challenge is the dynamic nature of cloud environments.  Tenant instances 
may come and go.  As the needs of providers grow, nodes are added dynamically to the 
environment.  In other cases, nodes are removed due to system faults or maintenance.   
Security sensors may come and go in these environments.  Therefore, our system must 
tolerate the inherent changing nature of these environments. 
 
Approach 
To address the problem of information overload from security sensors in dynamic IaaS 
cloud environments, we propose our distributed cloud intrusion monitoring and classification 
system.  Our system consists of a three step approach: 1) Summarize and Score, 2) Detect 
Anomalies, and 3) Classify Attacks shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  Three Step Approach 
Summarize and Score 
Summarize and score ingests alerts from security sensors in a cloud environment and 
calculates an urgency score for the alert message.  This approach is based on the concept of 
black swan events, or rare events that have a significant future impact (Damiani, 2009; Taleb, 
2010; Taylor & Williams, 2008).  In an IaaS cloud environment with several sensors reporting 
data, we derive a formula for detecting these rare events.  The urgency score is calculated 
using the number of times a message is reported historically in the entire cloud environment, 
by the individual node, and the count of alerts generated by the sensor. 
First, we calculate the message noise in the overall cloud environment: 
   
 
where 𝑚 is the number of times the alert message occurred and 𝑐 is the total count of all 
historical alert messages.  Next, we calculate the message noise for the reporting node (e.g., 
we determine how many times this alert has occurred at the node level): 
 
 
where 𝑚′ is the number of times the alert message occurred on the node and 𝑐′ is the total 
number of messages reported by the node.  Third, we calculate the message urgency score: 
 
 
where 𝑛 is the number of nodes in the cloud environment.  In addition to message urgency, 
we calculate sensor urgency: 
 
 
where 𝑚𝑠  is the total number of messages reported by all sensors and 𝑠 is the sensor count in 
the environment. Then, we calculate the urgency by the specific sensor reporting the message: 
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where 𝑚𝑠′ is the number of times the alert occurred from the sensor and 𝑠′ is the total number 
of alerts reported from the sensor.  Finally, we calculate the sensor urgency score 𝑈𝑆: 
 
 
where 𝑡 is the total number of sensors in the cloud environment.  Using these two scores, we 
derive an overall urgency value, 𝑈, for the alert: 
 
This value is used as the urgency score for the alert message in the system.  A value of 1.0 is 
most urgent, or a possible black swan event, while a value of 0 is least urgent.  In addition, 
sensors that infrequently report are given higher weight than those that commonly report.  The 
combination of weighted event messages and sensor output increases the priority of rare 
anomalous events and ranks alerts properly amongst peers.   
 
Detect Anomalies 
Detect anomalies utilizes alert messages and the urgency score from Summarize and 
Score to detect abnormal patterns in scores using a time series k nearest neighbor approach 
(Sutton, 2012).  We use window sizes of 15 and 30 tuples based on empirical 
experimentation.  The choice to use this approach is based on simplicity, accuracy, and 
performance.   
In addition, Detect Anomalies uses the mean and standard deviation of previously 
observed urgency scores to rank anomalous messages as important.  Values that fall outside of 
one standard deviation and within two standard deviations from the mean are labeled with 
medium importance.  Values that fall outside of two standard deviations from the mean are 
labeled as high importance.  Both medium and high alerts are considered potential threats. 
 
Classify Attacks 
Classify attacks ingests anomalous alert messages from Detect Anomalies and uses 10 
second tumbling windows to create signatures of alert messages and sensor ids.  Bayesian 
classification (Mihaescu, n.d.) is applied to signatures for classification of the potential attack. 
𝑈𝑆 = 1 − (𝑓(𝑚𝑠
′, 𝑠′) × (1 − (1 −
1
𝑡
)) + 𝑓(𝑚𝑠, 𝑠) × (1 −
1
𝑡
)) 
𝑈 = 𝑈𝑀 × 𝑈𝑆 
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Naive Bayesian classification is chosen because the classifier model is easily implemented, 
performs quickly, and has a history of success for classification (Rish, 2001).   
In addition to attack pattern classification, prioritized alert messages are displayed 
based on the standard deviation of the urgency score compared to previously observed scores.  
If an attack pattern is unknown, the window of alert messages may be used to train the 
classifier by applying the alerts to a classification rule.  If an unclassified attack occurs, the 
classifier can be placed into train mode and the attack is replayed and labeled.  Future similar 
patterns are recognized and classified as an attack defined by the specified label. 
 
Framework 
Our proposed framework consists of five components: Sensor Agents, Ingestor, 
Analyzer, Detector, and Classifier.  Figure 9 provides a visual representation of the 
components.  
 
 
Figure 9.  SCIMCS Framework Components 
 
Sensor Agents 
Sensor agents run on nodes hosting virtual machines.  The sensor agents receive the 
input message from a security module, format the alert message, and pass it to the Ingestor.  
For example, the sensor agent for the common intrusion detection system, Snort, receives the 
output from the Snort system, formats the message and appends metadata consisting of time 
stamp, date stamp, node, and sensor id.  The formatted message is then sent on to the Ingestor. 
 
Ingestor 
The Ingestor receives messages from sensor agents using the UDP protocol and has 
the capability to buffer events.  A throttling control is implemented to avoid back pressure 
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from the Analyzer.  The primary purpose of this component is to rapidly process event 
messages and to perform flow control to prevent message loss. 
 
Analyzer 
The Analyzer performs the Summarize and Score step of our system.  As sensor 
events arrive from the Ingestor, the Analyzer inserts each message along with a count into a 
persistent in memory data store.  Messages and counts are summarized at the cloud and node 
level.  In addition, sensor ids for types and specific sensors are persisted with counts of 
messages reported by the sensor.   
The Analyzer uses message counts to calculate an urgency value from the number of 
times the message has occurred historically in the cloud environment along with the number 
of messages generated by the sensor as described earlier in this chapter.  Furthermore, a decay 
time is introduced to reduce the count of messages every n seconds.  The reduction of 
message counts ensures that future critical messages are not overlooked. 
 
Detector  
 The Detector performs two roles.  First, it detects anomalies in urgency scores using k-
nearest neighbors over a sliding window.  The first time a high score arrives, it is flagged as 
an anomaly.  As the same score continues to arrive, the anomaly score decreases, resulting in 
in a reduction of messages passed to the classifier.  Second, the Detector labels alerts as high, 
medium, or low based upon the output from the Analyzer and standard deviations from the 
mean of alerts. 
 
Classifier 
The Classifier provides step three of our approach, Classify Attacks.  This component 
uses Naive Bayes Classification to label the attack using concatenated sensor and alerts in 10 
second data widows.  As previously mentioned, The Classifier also provides a training mode 
for adding new attack patterns. 
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System Instantiation 
We demonstrate our system in an IaaS cloud environment running Eucalyptus shown 
in Figure 10.  The environment consists of three nodes containing up to four virtual machines 
each, a cloud controller machine, and two machines dedicated to the SCIMCS.  This 
configuration is similar to a small business private IaaS cloud environment. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Cloud Environment 
 
 
Cloud Environment 
Figure 10 provides a conceptual view of the experimentation environment.  This 
environment consists of five physical multicore systems connected over Gigabit Ethernet on a 
private network.  The cloud computing environment is made up of the cloud controller and 
three node machines.  The Streaming Cloud Intrusion Monitoring and Classification system is 
distributed across two physical machines.  The Cloud Controller contains the management 
components for the Eucalyptus cloud infrastructure (Nurmi et al., 2009).  The nodes contain 
security agents as well as the Eucalyptus node controller component for cloud management.  
The SCIMCS consists of two physical systems which communicate with Agents on the nodes. 
48 
 
SCIMCS Implementation 
The SCIMCS implementation consists of the five components: Sensors, Ingestor, 
Analyzer, Detector, and Classifier. 
 
Sensors 
Five sensors are deployed on each of the nodes in the IaaS environment: HCIDS, 
Snort Sensor, Log Sensor, Network Sensor, and Rootkit Sensor.  HCIDS is a hypervisor based 
cloud intrusion detection system proposed in (Nikolai & Wang, 2014).  It monitors virtual 
machine performance metrics such as packets transmitted/received, block device read/write 
requests, and CPU utilization then seeks out anomalies.  A signature based categorization 
approach is used to emit alerts, as described in chapter five.   
The Snort sensor retrieves messages emitted from the Snort intrusion detection system 
(Kumar, 2012).  The Snort deployment is configured with all rules turned on.  This 
configuration ensures that valid attacks are not missed.  It also demonstrates the dilemma 
security administrators face with rule based systems.  If too few rules are active, attacks are 
missed.  If too many rules are active, large volumes of messages are generated.   
The log sensor retrieves node log messages from operating system logs.  Log 
messages can reveal abnormal system state and attacks. We monitor two logs: /var/log/secure 
and /var/log/audit/audit.log.  These logs provide operating system audit and security alerts.   
The network sensor monitors network flow using a Python script to sniff traffic and 
IBM Streams Anomaly Detection operator (Cancilla, 2015) to find anomalous patterns.  Two 
flow patterns are analyzed: the number of packets and packet rate.  A 60 second training 
window trains the anomaly detector and 30 second windows are used to detect anomalies.  
When an anomaly is detected, an alert is generated.   
Finally, the rootkit sensor runs a rootkit scan of the operating system which checks for 
signatures of abnormal behavior on a node.  If checks fail, an alert is generated with text from 
the failed check.  A modified version of the chkrootkit (Murilo & Steding-Jessen, n.d.) utility 
is used. 
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Ingestor 
The Ingestor is written in the IBM programming language SPL and runs within the 
IBM Streams (Ballard et al., 2010) distributed architecture.  This architecture provides the 
underlying high performance stream computing model and operators to throttle and buffer 
alert event messages.  In our implementation, we buffer up to 1,000 tuples and throttle the 
flow rate to 20 tuples per second. 
 
 
Analyzer 
The Analyzer is coded in Python.  Four dictionaries, which persist to disk upon 
program shutdown, are used to store summary data about alerts.  More specifically, messages 
are stored along with counts by cloud, node, sensor, and sensor type.  As described earlier in 
this chapter, the summary data is used to dynamically calculate the weighted urgency score 
based on message frequency.  Labels of high, medium and low are given to alert messages 
based on the number of standard deviations from the mean of urgency scores in the 
environment. 
 
Detector 
The Detector is implemented using IBM InfoSphere Streams.  The Streams Anomaly 
Detector operator (Cancilla, 2015) is used to perform anomaly detection using 15 values with 
a training data set of 30 tuples on the urgency scores generated by the Analyzer.  When an 
anomaly is detected, all of the messages that occurred during the anomalous time window are 
passed to the Classifier. 
 
Classifier 
The Classifier is written in Python using the Reverend Python module for Bayesian 
classification (Bakhtiar, 2009) and has two modes of operation: train and monitor.  In train 
mode, the administrator reproduces an attack.  The anomalous event sensor ids and messages 
are concatenated together for each alert message event during an attack in 10 second 
windows.  After attacks have been issued, the administrator applies a label defining the 
pattern (e.g., [nmap], [dos], etc).   
In monitor mode, the Classifier applies Bayesian classification to message patterns 
using the classification data from train mode.  When anomalous messages are detected by the 
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Detector, they are passed to the Classifier where concatenation with sensor ids is performed 
for each message in the 10 second window.  Then, Bayesian classification is used to find the 
closest match and display the type of attack.  A threshold of .50 is applied for displaying 
attack types based on empirical observation.  Pattern matches with less than a .50 probability 
match are not displayed.  In addition to the labeled attack, the Classifier outputs anomalous 
message alerts ranked as high, medium, or low based upon the score given by the Analyzer.   
An example of output from the Classifier is shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.  Classifer Output 
 
Demonstration and Evaluation 
This section details system analysis, training, experimentation attacks, and results.   
First, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our urgency score algorithm.  Next, we detail our 
experimentation approach.  Finally, we discuss the results. 
 
Urgency Score 
The proposed approach utilizes urgency score for alert prioritization.  To illustrate the 
effectiveness of our posited urgency score, we run simulated event messages against the 
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system.  First, 11 distinct messages (i.e., m1, m2… m11) are simulated for a total of 2,047 
messages.  The messages are broadcast in powers of two after the first message is sent.  In 
other words, m1 is broadcast one time, m2 is sent two times, m3 is pushed four times and m11 is 
passed to the analyzer 1,024 times.  Each unique message is generated from a different sensor 
on the same node.   
The results are shown in Figure 12.  The message urgency scores, UM, sensor urgency 
scores, US, and overall urgency score, U, are plotted for message m11.  Note that curve UM and 
curve US result in the same value because the message event is broadcast from a single node 
and sensor.   
The first occurrence of message arrival is scored high and falls above three standard 
deviations (3σ) from the mean of all message occurrences.  As previously mentioned, scores 
occurring beyond 1σ are considered potential threats, or black swan events. As illustrated, the 
urgency score, U, decreases in importance over time as expected. 
 
Figure 12.  Urgency Score Simulation - One Node 
 
 
 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the overall urgency score using both the message 
urgency score and sensor urgency score, the simulation continues on two additional nodes.  
The scores for message m11 on node3 are plotted in Figure 13.  The overall urgency score is 
reduced in this instance when both message count and sensor count are taken into account.  A 
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black swan event message from a sensor never previously reporting the message ranks higher 
than an event reported in the past.   
The dynamic component of the scoring system assures rare events are properly scored.  
In addition, our system prevents rare events from getting stale over time by incorporating a 
decay factor which decrements each message count every n seconds of system operation. In 
our experimentation, n is set to 600. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Urgency Score Simulation - Three Nodes 
 
 
 
Streaming Intrusion Monitoring 
Our system scores and analyzes streaming events from sensors by utilizing IBM 
Streams which provides a scalable and high performing infrastructure along with analytical 
support for anomaly detection.  To demonstrate the effectiveness of our streaming system, we 
examine the times from sensor generation to classification.  A sample of 500 messages reveals 
a minimum generation to classification time of less than one second, a maximum time of 20 
seconds and a mean time of five seconds during our experimentation. 
This sample suggests that an attacker would be detected within 20 seconds and if the 
attack has been previously classified, the attack type would also be known.  Counter actions 
could be automatically initiated in a production system. 
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Training the System 
Two components of the system are trained: Analyzer and Classifier.  This section 
describes the training procedure. 
 
 
Analyzer 
The Analyzer self-trains over time as messages are generated by the sensors.  High 
volume alert messages and noisy sensors are given a lower urgency score.  We complete this 
training by running the system for one hour in normal operational state without attack.   
 
Classifier 
To train the Classifier, we run the component in training mode.  Then, we conduct five 
attacks: an nmap scan, a syn flood attack, an ssh password crack attack, malware insertion, 
and we perform forensic counter measures by clearing logs.  The detail for each attack is 
provided in the next section.  After an attack is run, an appropriate label is assigned to the 
attack (e.g., [nmap], [synflood], etc.) 
 
Experimentation Attacks 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we perform attacks on the test 
environment using a four-step attack approach (Dell, 2012) to simulate a real attack.  The four 
steps consist of a reconnaissance phase, an intrusion and advanced attack phase, a malware 
insertion phase, and a cleanup phase.   
First, in the reconnaissance phase, an attacker attempts to learn about potential target 
systems.  In our experimentation, we use the nmap tool (Lyon, 2015) to scan systems in our 
cloud environment.  We pass the nmap tool parameters ’-T4 -A -v’ to conduct an intense scan.  
The goal is to discover more information about vulnerable systems.   
Second, the intrusion and advanced attack phase occurs after attackers find vulnerable 
systems.  For this phase of attack we perform a synflood using the hping tool (Sanfilippo, 
2015) with the parameter ’–flood’ against port 80 and a ssh password attack using the ncrack 
tool (Hantzis, 2015).  The ncrack tool performs a dictionary attack against the root user on 
multiple nodes.   
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Third, in the malware insertion phase, malware is inserted into the environment to give 
the attacker future access to the system.  In our experimentation, we use the netcat tool 
(Anonymous, 2007) to open a bindshell using the ’-L’ parameter.   
And, fourth, in the cleanup phase, forensic evidence is removed from the system.  We 
clear two logs to remove traces that we logged into the system by clearing the files 
/var/log/wtmp and /var/log/lastlog.  These logs contain user login history to the system. 
 
Results 
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by examining our initial goals.  
First, we show how our work reduces the volume of alarms without reducing the effectiveness 
of security systems.   Second, we demonstrate through experimentation the effectiveness of 
using Bayesian classification for proper attack classification.  Table 6 summarizes our 
findings for message reduction results. 
 
Table 6.  Message Reduction Results 
Attack Number of 
total alerts 
generated 
during attack 
Number of 
alerts 
determined to 
be important 
Number of 
attack 
messages not 
reported 
Percentage of 
alert reduction 
Reconnaissance: 
nmap 
4795 163 0 96.6% 
Intrusion and 
advanced attack 
1:  synflood 
4598 561 0 87.8% 
Intrusion and 
advanced attack 
2:  nCrack 
3242 442 0 86.4% 
Malware 
Insertion:  bind 
attack 
4112 50 0 98.5% 
Clean-up:  
Remove logs 
5050 86 0 98.3% 
No attack 1 (20 
minutes) 
7468 88 n/a 98.8% 
No attack 2 (20 
minutes) 
7441 122 n/a 98.4% 
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From Table 6, the results of our experimentation are promising.  We observe an 
average 95.9 percent message reduction.  To verify that critical alerts were not missed, we 
manually compare the generated alarm messages with those reported by the Classifier. 
 
Table 7.  Attack Classification Results 
Attack Number of 
attacks 
Number of 
attacks 
properly 
classified 
Number of 
attacks 
improperly 
classified 
Attack 
classification 
accuracy 
Reconnaissance: 
nmap 
10 10 0 100% 
Intrusion and 
advanced attack 
1:  synflood 
10 10 0 100% 
Intrusion and 
advanced attack 
2:  nCrack 
10 10 0 100% 
Malware 
Insertion:  bind 
attack 
10 10 0 100% 
Clean-up:  
Remove logs 
10 10 0 100% 
No attack 1 (20 
minutes) 
54* 40* 14* 74.1% 
No attack 2 (20 
minutes) 
58 58 0 100% 
 
 
Table 7 summarizes our classification findings. When not under attack, sensors 
occasionally generate low volume messages which are displayed by the Classifier.  To 
address this issue, we trained the Classifier to flag these patterns are none threats.  After the 
attacks are trained in the system, we achieve a 100 percent accuracy in attack classification. 
However, as previously discussed, when attack patterns have not been trained (labeled with a 
* in the table), we observe a 25.9 percent misclassification rate in our environment.  After 
training the message patterns, the classification accuracy returns to 100 percent.  Table 8 
provides a summary of the sensors generating messages by type of attacks. 
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Table 8.  Signatures 
Attack Sensor 
HCIDS Snort 
Sensor 
Log Sensor Network 
Sensor 
Rootkit 
Sensor 
Reconnaissance: 
nmap 
- X - - - 
Intrusion and 
advanced attack 
1:  synflood 
X - - X - 
Intrusion and 
advanced attack 
2:  nCrack 
- - X - - 
Malware 
Insertion:  bind 
attack 
- - - - X 
Clean-up:  
Remove logs 
- - - - X 
 
 
Other Observations 
During our experimentation, a rogue log sensor was introduced into the environment. 
This noisy sensor emitted several messages per second.  The system classified the noise as a 
potential synflood providing further supporting evidence for our approach. 
Conclusion and Future Work 
The multi-tenant, diverse nature of an IaaS cloud environment increases security 
complexity.  Lack of control over the data and applications running on tenant instances makes 
securing these environments challenging for cloud providers.  One approach recommended by 
the Cloud Security Alliance is a defense in depth strategy where multiple layers of protection 
provide a defense against bad actors.  To implement this approach, multiple security 
technologies are deployed.  Monitoring these technologies and knowing which alerts to act 
upon is non-trivial for cloud providers.   
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Our work demonstrates that sensors which ingest output from these security 
technologies can be used to feed a multistep approach that summarizes and scores alerts, 
detects anomalies, and classifies attack patterns.  First, our approach utilizes security 
technology alert messages and sensor ids along with message and sensor volume data to score 
the importance of a particular alert message.  Next, time series analysis is applied using k 
nearest neighbor anomaly detection over sliding windows of alert urgency scores.  Finally, we 
classify the anomalous alerts using Bayesian classification.  In addition to classification, alerts 
are output with a priority value of high, medium or low based upon how the alert score 
deviates from the mean of alert scores for all historical alerts in the IaaS cloud environment.   
We demonstrate our approach through implementation and experimentation.  During 
experimentation, we observe a total alert reduction of 95.9 percent with a zero percent miss 
rate for attack messages.  In addition, a 100 percent classification rate is demonstrated for 
previously trained attacks.  We suggest five areas for future research.  First, more attack 
experimentation is needed to determine the effectiveness of Bayesian classification as well as 
other machine learning techniques.  Second, we recommend introducing more sensors in the 
environment.  As the number of sensors increase, the effectiveness of our classification 
approach should improve.  We hypothesize that the use of more sensors which can detect 
specific attacks will improve our Bayesian classification technique as well as other similar 
techniques.  Third, we encourage scaling the approach to a large IaaS cloud environment.  
Our test bed is a small cloud environment, similar to a small business.  At this time, we can 
only extrapolate our results to larger cloud environments.  Fourth, we suggest a technique of 
multilayer classification using our technique in this chapter.  In other words, we hypothesize 
using multiple layers of classification could allow for detection of attack phases.  
Longitudinal analysis of detected attacks could reveal patterns relating to how far the bad 
actor has progressed in an attack.  And, fifth, we encourage research in applying other 
machine learning, anomaly detection, and classification techniques. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A SYSTEM FOR DETECTING MALICIOUS INSIDER 
DATA THEFT 
On August 25, 2006, Amazon EC2, one of the leading Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) cloud offerings, went into beta (Barr, 2006).  Since then, cloud computing has become 
big business.  The largest technology companies in the world now provide cloud computing 
offerings and solutions (Google, 2015; IBM, 2015; Microsoft, 2015).  However, cloud 
computing is not without challenges. According to the Cloud Security Alliance (Cloud 
Security Alliance, 2013), data theft and insider attacks are two of the nine critical threats 
facing cloud security.   
Insider attacks fall into three categories: malicious, accidental, and non-malicious 
(Willis-Ford, 2015).  Malicious insiders conduct activities such as ip theft, information 
technology sabotage, fraud, and espionage, with intent of doing harm or for personal gain.  
Accidental insider attacks occur when unintentional misuse of systems is performed by a user 
without the intent of harm.  And, non-malicious insider attacks are intentional attacks where 
the user attempts to perform self-benefiting activities but without malicious intent.   
Technical controls exist for reducing the risk of insider attacks, including intrusion 
detection systems, security information and event management, data loss prevention, access 
control systems, and honey-tokens.  In addition, non-technical controls are used and consist of 
psychology prediction models, education and awareness, as well as information security 
policies (Elmrabit, Yang, & Yang, 2015).  While controls exist, not all insider attacks can be 
detected.  Furthermore, several approaches for addressing insider attacks are reactive and not 
predictive in nature.  Techniques for preventing such attacks are needed (Maxim, 2011).   
Although no single approach can prevent all insider threats, a multi-faceted proactive 
technique can be used to reduce the risk of damage caused by inside attackers (Maxim, 2011). 
Several types of attacks exist, including unauthorized extraction of data, data tampering, asset 
destruction, illegal downloading, eavesdropping, spoofing, social engineering, resource 
misuse, and installing of malicious software (M. Ben Salem, Hershkop, & Stolfo, 2008).   
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Our work puts forth a new security control for detecting one type of insider attack, 
unauthorized extraction of data, or data theft.  The importance of reducing the risk of data 
theft gained recent international attention when the National Security Agency contractor, 
Edward Snowden, downloaded and disseminated classified documents about intelligence 
programs (Elmrabit et al., 2015).  A system to detect and possibly thwart such actions has 
significant potential to contribute to a successful defense in depth (SANS, 2001) security 
strategy and reduce the damage of data theft from inside attackers.   
We posit a system profiling approach for detecting abnormal login activity and data 
transfers from IaaS cloud computing nodes hosting tenant virtual machines.  This approach 
aims to address the problem of rogue administrators as described in Claycomb and Nicoll 
(Claycomb & Nicoll, 2012) who attempt to steal data from nodes as discussed in Duncan, 
Creese and Goldsmith (Duncan, Creese, & Goldsmith, 2012).  Our approach uses k-nearest 
neighbors anomaly detection to detect abnormal variations in bytes sent over the network and 
number of active users on the cloud node.  Furthermore, we examine system state data 
consisting of open files and network connections to improve detection and provide forensic 
data for investigation.   
Unauthorized extraction attacks are especially important to address in IaaS cloud 
environments to prevent theft of tenant virtual machine data.  Although encryption may 
reduce risk of insiders having the ability to use stolen data, encrypted virtual machine images 
and data store files may be copied from nodes and attacked off line.   
In our system, agents are installed on cloud nodes hosting virtual machines and data.  
The system is trained under normal cloud operating conditions.  Then, the system monitors 
for anomalies in transmitted network data and active user logins using k-nearest neighbors 
anomaly detection.  This data is used to detect anomalies that exceed normal operating 
thresholds established during training.   
Our results suggest that using k-nearest neighbors anomaly detection to monitor node 
network transmissions and number of active users along with system state information can be 
used to detect 100 percent of abnormal login activity and data copies to outside systems by 
users.  Furthermore, we observe a zero false positive detection rate when anomalies in active 
user counts and bytes transmitted are detected along with supporting system state data.   
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  First, related work is discussed. 
Second, the design of our system for detecting malicious insider data theft presented.  Third, 
the system is demonstrated and results are discussed.  Fourth, our work is summarized and we 
discuss future works. 
Related Work 
A number of works have been posited to reduce the threat of insider attacks. Stolfo, 
Salm, and Keromytis posit an approach to mitigate attacks using fog computing where they 
detect abnormal usage patterns and present potential attackers with misinformation (Stolfo, 
Salem, & Keromytis, 2012).  Claycomb and Nicoll discuss the threat of rogue administrators 
and suggest process based approaches to deal with the threat.  Furthermore, they discuss 
future research topics which include predictive models (Claycomb & Nicoll, 2012).  Colombe 
and Stephens suggest an approach to visualize intrusion detection system data to detect insider 
attacks (Colombe & Stephens, 2004).  Babu and Bhanu research an approach for using key 
stroke dynamics to detect insiders (Bondada & Bhanu, 2014).  A more related and interesting 
technique for detecting insider attacks is the use of machine learning and rule based detection 
posited by Khorshed and Wasimi (Khorshed, Ali, & Wasimi, 2011).  They suggest that rule 
based learning can be used to detect insider attacks in a cloud environment and that 
continuous cloud monitoring is an important part of cloud security.  Sriram, Patel, and 
Lakshmanan posit a hybrid protocol using selective encryption and data cleaning along with 
user profiling and decoy technology to address the problem of inside attackers.  One aspect of 
their work related to our approach is the use of a neural network that examines volume of data 
downloaded, nature of the operations, division of the task, ip address, and log files (Sriram, 
Patel, Harishma, & Lakshmanan, 2014).  In previous work, we have put forth a system for 
detecting attacks from and against virtual machines in an IaaS cloud environment using 
anomalies in performance metrics obtained from the hypervisor (Nikolai & Wang, 2014).   
To the best of our knowledge, applying the approach described in this chapter is novel. 
While insider attack detection and prevention is an active research area, we are unable to find 
existent works specifically targeting the problem of insider data theft using anomaly 
detection, system metrics, and system state information.  Furthermore, we demonstrate our 
work through instantiation and experimentation with promising results. 
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Design and Development 
An IaaS cloud environment typically consists of virtual machines hosted on physical 
nodes which run node controller agents.  A single node may host virtual machine instances of 
different tenants.  Each tenant may run various applications and workloads.  In addition, 
virtual machines are dynamic and may be created and destroyed by tenant requests at any time 
resulting in an ever changing environment.  Our work posits an approach to detect data theft 
within an IaaS cloud environment.  More specifically, we seek to detect rogue administrators 
following the flow in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14.  Insider Data Theft Flow Chart 
 
Most production deployment policies restrict administrator login to systems.  Our 
approach supports these controls by logging unusual login events.  In addition, knowledgeable 
attackers are aware of forensic countermeasures.  Hence, all of our detection and analysis 
must be performed on near real time data and persisted to a remote system.   
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The specific pattern that our system detects is shown in Figure 14 and consists of three 
steps: attacker logs in node, attacker copies data to outside system, and attacker logs out from 
node.  Each event is considered an attack anomaly.  In our approach, we examine the anomaly 
value for the number of active users and amount of data sent from the node.  This approach 
allows the system to adapt to various environments and adjust to normal fluctuations that can 
occur in the environment.  Furthermore, we examine system state forensic data for open 
connections and open files.  In order for data theft to occur, an external connection must exist 
and a data file open for reading. 
 
Approach 
Our approach for detecting insider data theft uses a three step technique illustrated in 
Figure 15.  First, the system is trained.  Then, the system is put into monitoring mode.  And, 
finally, a state-based rules approach is used to detect signatures of insider data theft. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Insider Data Theft Detection Approach 
 
Train 
A goal of training mode is to not burden security operations with excessive tuning in 
order to achieve accurate results.  A system with a complicated training requirement lacks 
scalability.  To achieve this goal, the system is placed into training mode while normal IaaS 
cloud activities occur.  Our assumption is that attacks are not occurring during this period.  
Restricted access and additional manual monitoring may be applied during this period to 
reduce the likelihood of an attack.   
Virtual machines are created and terminated.  Tenants run various workloads.  Data is 
sent from an agent on each cloud node hosting virtual machines to our system.  During this 
time, we examine two system metrics for detecting insider attacks: number of active users on 
nodes and number of tcp bytes transmitted to the network from these nodes.  Maximum k-
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nearest neighbors anomaly scores derived using the IBM InfoSphere Streams anomaly 
detection operator (Cancilla, 2015) are calculated to be used later in monitoring mode.   
Values arrive separately for each metric every second and are stored in memory.  The 
first 20 values create the reference pattern.  A current pattern of 10 values is compared to a 
subsequence of the reference pattern calculating an anomaly score.  A total score is computed 
from the subsequence comparison scores.  As each value arrives, a score is computed, and the 
window slides to the left.  As anomalous events occur, the score increases.  This total score is 
the anomaly value used by our system.   
The pattern sizes of 20 and 10 are derived through empirical analysis with a goal of 
accuracy and performance in mind.  Tuning these values is beyond the scope of this work and 
is considered as future work.  In addition, although thr number of active users and bytes sent 
over the network are the two metrics used for insider data theft detection, we collect metric 
anomaly data on user space, cpu usage, virtual memory, network connections, input/output 
read bytes, input/output write bytes, network bytes received, network bytes sent, number of 
users logged into node, and number of processes.  In future work, we plan to investigate 
machine learning techniques with the goal of deriving more complex insider attack signatures. 
 
Monitor 
The system is placed into monitor mode with no attack assumptions.  Similar to 
training mode, system metric data is sent from agents on cloud nodes to our system.  Virtual 
machines are created, terminated, and tenant workloads run.  Anomaly scores are calculated 
as previously done in training mode.  However, instead of calculating maximum anomalous 
scores for each system metric, the calculated values are compared to the maximum values 
derived during the training period.  Values that do not exceed the maximum scores are filtered 
from the system and ignored.   
The plot in Figure 16 illustrates sample anomaly values for network transmission.  
Figure 17 shows the anomaly values compared to the trained reference pattern.  
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Figure 16.  Network txbytes Anomaly Scores under Normal Conditions 
 
 
Figure 17.  Network txbytes Anomaly Scores Normal Conditions with Trained Max 
 
From Figure 17, one can observe that the trained maximum anomaly score is greater 
than the current tcp bytes transmitted anomaly score.  Hence, anomalous activity is not 
detected. 
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Detect 
Detection of insider data theft involves three events: a login anomaly (E1), a data 
transfer anomaly (E2), and forensic evidence (E3) as shown in Figure 18.  When all three 
events are present (A3), we observe a 100 percent detection rate with a zero percent false 
positive rate.  In this case, a login anomaly (E1) is detected followed by an abnormal data 
transfer (E2).  And, forensic evidence (E3) is detected for both a network connection to the 
node and open files being copied.  The forensic evidence is collected by the agent and is 
analyzed after E1 and E2 anomaly events occur. 
 
 
Figure 18.  Detection of Insider Data Theft Venn Diagram 
 
During experimentation, we examine condition A1 and A2 in isolation to determine 
whether a single event can be used for detection.  We produce false positives for condition A2 
by performing denial of service attacks between virtual machines hosted on nodes in the 
environment.  In the case where E1 is present, a false positive is generated.  This is considered 
a false positive because a denial of service attack is not a data theft scenario.  To simulate A1, 
we turn off forensic evidence detection to examine the false positive and negative rates.  We 
find that using both E1 and E2 as a vehicle to detect insider attacks is mostly successful.  
However, instances such as Denial of Service attacks or massive data transfers from virtual 
machines hosted on nodes can result in false positives and false negatives.   
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Figure 19 illustrates one sample from our experimentation for event E2.   
 
 
Figure 19.  Network txbytes Anomaly 
 
Figure 20 shows a sample from our experimentation for event E1. 
 
 
Figure 20.  Active User Anomaly 
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Both Figure 19 and Figure 20 illustrate significant anomaly scores above the trained 
maximum for network transmitted bytes and active user logins.  The detection of all three 
conditions is required to eliminate false positives. 
 
System Instantiation 
We demonstrate our system in an IaaS cloud environment running the Eucalyptus 
cloud infrastructure shown in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21.  Cloud Environment 
 
Cloud Environment 
Figure 21 provides a conceptual view of the experimentation environment.  The 
Eucalyptus cloud framework is used because of its similarities to the popular Amazon cloud 
infrastructure.  IBM Streams provides a scalable infrastructure with built in analytical 
functions.  Furthermore, both technologies are available free of charge for research purposes.   
The physical environment consists of five multi-core systems connected over Gigabit 
Ethernet on a private network.  The Cloud Controller contains the management components 
for the Eucalyptus cloud infrastructure (Nurmi et al., 2009).  The Nodes contain Eucalyptus 
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node controllers and our agent written in Python to gather system metrics.  The Insider Data 
Theft Detector runs IBM Streams and our system implementation code. 
 
Insider Data Theft Detection System Implementation 
Our system implementation consists of two components, agents that gather system 
metrics from cloud nodes and a detector which analyzes the data. 
 
Agents 
The Agent component is written in Python and runs on every node hosting virtual 
machines.  It uses the psutil package along with calls to netstat to gather, format, and send 
data to the detector using a UDP socket connection.  The output includes system metrics as 
described earlier and open connections as well as file state data. 
 
Detector 
The Detector is written in two programming languages: Python and Streams 
Processing Language (SPL).  The Python script has two modes of operations, training and 
monitoring.  Similarly, two SPL programs are used for training and monitoring.   
In training mode, the Python script ingests metric data from agents and sends it to the 
SPL program. The anomaly detector operator is used to calculate an anomaly score and 
maximum training data is persisted in a JSON formatted file.   
In monitoring mode, the Python script loads the JSON file into memory and enriches 
agent data with maximum anomaly values established during training.  The SPL program 
ingests the data from the Python script and calculates the anomaly score similar to training 
mode.  However, instead of saving scores to a file, anomaly values are compared in real time 
with the maximum values established during training.  Values that exceed the maximum 
anomaly value for a given metric are passed to an alert script written in Python.  System state 
data is persisted to a file as it arrives from each agent and acts as a forensic trail.   
The alert Python script listens for abnormal login events and data transfer events.  
When an event is detected, the forensic data associated with the event is retrieved from the 
data file.  If forensic data related to open connections and files is retrieved from the data file 
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for the event, an alert is logged indicating that a data theft attack occurred.  Login events are 
always logged. 
Demonstration and Evaluation 
This section details training the system, data theft attacks executed, attack messages 
reported, and summarizes our results. 
 
Training the System 
Training of the system occurred over a one hour period of time.  To test the 
effectiveness of our approach, we refrain from applying tenant virtual machine workloads 
during the training period.  Instead, we train the system by launching and terminating several 
different virtual machines.  We create up to 12 medium and small virtual machines with 
Centos 6, Centos 7 and Ubuntu precise images.  After the virtual machines become accessible, 
they are terminated.  This approach creates a baseline of activity for the Eucalyptus 
environment without attempting to predict the workload of users.  Furthermore, this meets the 
goal for a practical and simplistic training approach. 
 
Normal Operating Conditions 
Under normal operating conditions, tenant virtual machines are randomly created and 
terminated placing the cloud environment into various states consisting of starting, stopping, 
and running virtual machines under load and in idle state.  Furthermore, at times, tenant 
virtual machines place excessive network traffic load on 50 percent of the virtual machines 
transferring data to and from nodes.  Load is placed on the virtual machine using system 
updates and web data transfers. 
 
Data Theft Attacks 
The goal of our experimentation is to demonstrate the effectiveness for using our 
system to detect data theft of tenant data on IaaS cloud nodes and virtual machines.  We use 
copies of actual virtual machine data which is approximately five gigabytes in size.  In 
addition, we test the system with smaller data theft events, including the theft of data files 500 
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megabytes and 100 megabytes in size.  Various data sizes provide supporting evidence for the 
effectiveness of the system. 
 
Attack Messages Reported 
We conduct 48 attacks during our experimentation.  An attack is considered an 
unapproved login or data transfer event.  Of these attacks, 48 are detected and reported.  A 
sample of the system output is shown below in the following format: [node reporting],[date 
reported],[time reported], [alert message], [forensic data].  The forensic data is reduced 
because of space constraints. 
 
...”node1.cloud.res”,”2016-03-12”,”14:09:42”,”[INSIDER] [Node: node1.cloud.res] 
[Attack Detected: Abnormal user login activity detected] ”, ”@sconn(...laddr=( 192.168.1.98 
22) raddr=( 192.168.1.110 52925)...” 
 
”node1.cloud.res”,”2016-03-12”,”14:13:49”,”[INSIDER] [Node: node1.cloud.res] 
[Attack Detected: Abnormally large data transfer detected] ”,”...popenfile(path= 
/root/theft1...” 
 
From the sample data above, one can observe that the forensic data reveals the IP 
address of the attacker and file being copied along with supporting evidence to assist with an 
investigation.   
 
Results 
The goal of our work is to detect insider data theft in IaaS cloud environments.  Our 
approach uses three events, login anomalies, data transfer anomalies, and forensic data to 
detect attacks.  During experimentation, we perform attacks using all three events for attack 
detection and observe a 100 percent detection rate in under 60 seconds with zero false 
positives for 48 attacks contained in 233,829 data sets sent by node agents.  The results are 
shown in Table 9.   
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Table 9.  Experimentation Results 
IaaS State VM Workload Type of Attack Number of 
Attacks 
Percent 
Detected 
No VMs 
running 
None Login 3 100% 
No VMs 
running 
None Five GB data 
theft 
3 100% 
10 VMs starting None Login 3 100% 
10 VMs starting None Five GB data 
theft 
3 100% 
10 VMs running None Login 3 100% 
10 VMs running None Five GB data 
theft 
3 100% 
10 VMs 
stopping 
None Login 3 100% 
10 VMs 
stopping 
None Five GB data 
theft 
3 100% 
10 VMs running Five VM 
workload 
Login 3 100% 
10 VMs running Five VM 
workload 
Five GB data 
theft 
3 100% 
10 VMs 
stopping 
Five VM 
workload 
Login 3 100% 
10 VMs 
stopping 
Five VM 
workload 
Five GB data 
theft 
3 100% 
10 VMs running Five VM 
workload 
Login 3 100% 
10 VMs running Five VM 
workload 
500 MB data 
theft 
3 100% 
10 VMs running Five VM 
workload 
Login 3 100% 
10 VMs running Five VM 
workload 
100 MB data 
theft 
3 100% 
 
We also examine each event in isolation and find flaws in the use of single events: 
 
Login Events (E1) Only 
Examining login events in isolation using our approach detects 100 percent of 
anomalous user login and logout activity.  However, this cannot be used to detect insider data 
theft. 
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Data Transfer Anomaly Events (E2) Only 
Data transfer anomalies can be solely used to detect data theft events.  However, we 
observe an unacceptably high 22.6 percent false positive rate under extreme operating 
conditions.  These extremes occur during excessive starting and stopping of all virtual 
machines in the cloud environment and under heavy cloud tenant data transfer workload. 
Furthermore, when performing denial of service attacks between tenant nodes, we observe a 
100 percent false positive rate using these events in isolation. 
 
Forensic Data (E3) Only 
System state data for open connections and open files also can be used to detect both 
abnormal login activity and data theft attacks.  However, this approach is unreliable.  During 
our experimentation, we observe normal connection activity between the node controller and 
the cloud controller.  While rules could be created to filter out known connections, the 
complexity of creating rules and filters would complicate the system and not meet our 
requirement for usability and ease of use. 
Conclusion and Future Work 
We put forth a train, monitor, detect pattern for detecting insider data theft attacks.  
Our system profiling approach utilizes a combination of system metric anomalies and system 
state data.  More specifically, we use a k-nearest neighbors anomaly detection algorithm to 
score the number of active users on nodes and bytes sent over the network.  Excessive scores 
compared to scores calculated during training indicate an attack event.  In addition, system 
state data on open connections and files is collected and analyzed.  Our experimentation 
suggests that the combination of login events, data transfer events and system state events 
results in a 100 percent detection rate for insider data theft attacks with a zero percent false 
positive rate.   
To expand on our work, three areas should be explored.  First, scalability of the 
approach needs to be tested in a large IaaS cloud environment.  Second, various anomaly 
detection approaches should be explored.  And, third, leveraging machine learning techniques 
to find rules may reveal combinations of system metrics for better detection of insider attacks.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, we set out to explore security and privacy concerns in IaaS cloud 
computing environments.  More specially, our research focuses on the instantiation of new 
security control artifacts that make up a system of novel security controls to reduce the risk of 
deploying in these multi-tenant and dynamic environments.  We set out to explore three 
research questions.   First, how can we detect attacks on cloud tenant instances without 
specific knowledge of tenant applications in order to preserve privacy?  Second, how can we 
assist cloud providers with interpretation of the output from security controls in an IaaS cloud 
environment to improve security?  And, third, how can we help protect cloud tenants from 
insider data theft attacks?    
Based on the research questions, we aim to achieve three research objectives through 
the instantiation of new security control artifacts making up an overall system.  The first 
objective is achieved through the instantiation of a new system for detecting abnormal usage 
in virtual machines using system performance metrics obtained by the hypervisor, or our 
Hypervisor-based Cloud Intrusion Detection System.  In this work, we demonstrate and 
publish our work which lays the ground work for using performance signatures from 
hypervisors and rule based attack classification to detect and halt attacks from and against 
virtual machine instances in cloud environments without knowing the precise workload 
running on the virtual machine.   Instantiation and demonstration of the system reveals a 100 
percent detection rate for denial of service attacks from and against the virtual machine. 
The second objective is accomplished through the instantiation of a new approach and 
system for reducing the vast numbers of alarms that can occur from a defense in depth 
approach with many sensors in the cloud environment.  We derive a three step approach 
consisting of summarize and score, detect anomalies, and classify attacks.  Construction and 
demonstration of this system reveals that we are able to reduce the alarm volume by 95.9 
percent.  In addition, when properly trained, this approach has a 100 percent classification rate 
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using Bayesian classification.  This work lays the ground work for future research on alert 
reduction and attack classification from multiple security sensors in cloud environments. 
The third objective set forth in our research is the detection of insider data theft 
attacks.  We develop and instantiate a system which detects the transfer of files from cloud 
nodes which can be used to detect the theft of virtual machines and data stores by examining 
system state along with anomalies in bytes transmitted and number of active users on the 
system.   We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach with a 100 percent detection rate 
of simulated data thefts in a cloud environment.  Our research lays the ground work for 
further research in node system usage metrics and system state from the granular detection of 
insider attacks. 
We accomplished the goals that we set out to achieve of examining the three research 
questions with an objective to create an artifact for each question.  Furthermore, our work is 
or will soon be published in the proceedings from three flagship IEEE conferences (Nikolai & 
Wang, 2014, 2016a, 2016b) which further validates our work, demonstrates the relevance of 
our research, and contributes back to the knowledge base.  Although we are successful in our 
research, we merely lay the ground work for additional exploration and research.  Much work 
is still needed to explore the scalability of our approaches and system.   Each artifact must be 
demonstrated in large scale cloud environments to ensure the effectiveness of the solution.  
Also, new anomaly detection approaches should be researched to determine optimal 
techniques for each component.  Machine learning and advanced rules engines should also be 
considered in future research.    
 
 
  
75 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, S. P., & de Palma, A. (2005). A theory of information overload. Unpublished 
Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Virginia. JOUR. 
Anonymous. (2007). Netcat: the TCP/IP swiss army. Retrieved June 23, 2015, from 
http://nc110.sourceforge.net/ 
Armbrust, M., Fox, A., Griffith, R., Joseph, A. D., Katz, R. H., Konwinski, A., … Stoica, I. 
(2009). Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing. EECS Department, 
University of California, Berkeley, Tech. Rep. UCB/EECS-2009-28, 53(UCB/EECS-
2009-28), 07–013. JOUR. http://doi.org/10.1145/1721654.1721672 
Avritzer, A., Tanikella, R., James, K., Cole, R. G., & Weyuker, E. (2010). Monitoring for 
security intrusion using performance signatures (pp. 93–104). CONF, ACM. Retrieved 
from internal-pdf://p93-avritzer-1674896640/p93-avritzer.pdf 
Bakhtiar, A. (2009). Reverend : 0.4. Retrieved October 21, 2015, from 
https://www.versioneye.com/python/Reverend/0.4 
Ballard, C., Farrell, D. M., Lee, M., Stone, P. D., Thibault, S., & Tucker, S. (2010). IBM 
Infosphere Streams: Harnessing Data in Motion. GEN, IBM. 
Barr, J. (2006). Amazon EC2 Beta. Retrieved October 31, 2015, from 
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/amazon_ec2_beta/ 
Biggs, S., & Vidalis, S. (2009). Cloud Computing: The Impact on Digital Forensic 
Investigations (pp. 1–6). CONF, IEEE. Retrieved from internal-pdf://05402561-
4005005324/05402561.pdf 
Bondada, M. B., & Bhanu, S. M. S. (2014). Analyzing User Behavior Using Keystroke 
Dynamics to Protect Cloud from Malicious Insiders. Cloud Computing in Emerging 
Markets (CCEM), 2014 IEEE International Conference on. CONF. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/CCEM.2014.7015481 
Cancilla, J. (2015). Anomaly Detection in Streams. Retrieved October 21, 2015, from 
https://developer.ibm.com/streamsdev/docs/anomaly-detection-in-streams/ 
76 
Christodorescu, M., Sailer, R., Schales, D. L., Sgandurra, D., & Zamboni, D. (2009). Cloud 
security is not (just) virtualization security: a short paper (pp. 97–102). CONF, ACM. 
Claycomb, W. R., & Nicoll, A. (2012). Insider Threats to Cloud Computing: Directions for 
New Research Challenges. Computer Software and Applications Conference 
(COMPSAC), 2012 IEEE 36th Annual. CONF. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/COMPSAC.2012.113 
Cloud Security Alliance. (2011). Security guidance for critical areas of focus in cloud 
computing v3.0 (article). Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Security+Guidance+C
ritical+Areas+of+Focus+for#0 
Cloud Security Alliance. (2013). The Notorious Nine Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013 
(Report). Cloud Security Alliance. Retrieved from 
https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/top_threats/The_Notorious_Nine_
Cloud_Computing_Top_Threats_in_2013.pdf 
Cobb, S. (2014). Target breach 12 months on a year of lessons learned. Retrieved September 
1, 2015, from http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/12/18/target-breach-lessons-
learned/#lessons 
Colombe, J. B., & Stephens, G. (2004). Statistical profiling and visualization for detection of 
malicious insider attacks on computer networks. In Proceedings of the 2004 ACM 
workshop on Visualization and data mining for computer security (pp. 138–142). CONF, 
ACM. 
Damiani, E. (2009). Composite intrusion detection in process control networks. JOUR. 
Debar, H., & Wespi, A. (2001). Aggregation and correlation of intrusion-detection alerts. 
Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 85–103. http://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45474-
8_6 
Dell. (2012). Anatomy of a cyber-attack. Retrieved October 1, 2015, from 
http://software.dell.com/documents/anatomy-of-a-cyber-attack-ebook-24640.pdf 
Dhage, S. N., & Meshram, B. B. (2012). Intrusion detection system in cloud computing 
environment. International Journal of Cloud Computing, 1(2), 261–282. Journal Article. 
77 
Doelitzscher, F., Reich, C., & Sulistio, A. (2010). Designing Cloud Services Adhering to 
Government Privacy Laws (pp. 930–935). CONF, IEEE. Retrieved from internal-
pdf://crl-2010-02-0785593356/CRL-2010-02.pdf 
Duncan, A. J., Creese, S., & Goldsmith, M. (2012). Insider Attacks in Cloud Computing. 
Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom), 2012 IEEE 
11th International Conference on. CONF. http://doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom.2012.188 
Elmrabit, N., Yang, S.-H., & Yang, L. (2015). Insider threats in information security 
categories and approaches. Automation and Computing (ICAC), 2015 21st International 
Conference on. CONF. http://doi.org/10.1109/IConAC.2015.7313979 
Eucalyptus Components. (2013). [Web Page]. Retrieved February 15, 2015, from 
http://www.eucalyptus.com/docs/3.1/ig/euca_components.html 
Fan, G., Jihua, Y., & Mingxing, D. (2009). Design and implementation of a distributed IDS 
alert aggregation model. Computer Science & Education, 2009. ICCSE ’09. 4th 
International Conference on. CONF. http://doi.org/10.1109/ICCSE.2009.5228172 
Garfinkel, T., & Rosenblum, M. (2003). A virtual machine introspection based architecture 
for intrusion detection (Vol. 1, pp. 253–285). CONF, Citeseer. Retrieved from internal-
pdf://garfinkel2003-0560777473/Garfinkel2003.pdf 
Google. (2015). Google Cloud Platform. Retrieved October 31, 2015, from 
https://cloud.google.com/ 
Gul, I., & Hussain, M. (2011). Distributed Cloud Intrusion Detection Model. International 
Journal of Advanced Science and Technology, 34, 71–82. JOUR. 
Gupta, D., Joshi, P. S. S., Bhattacharjee, A. K. K., & Mundada, R. S. S. (2012). IDS alerts 
classification using knowledge-based evaluation. In 2012 Fourth International 
Conference on Communication Systems and Networks COMSNETS 2012 (pp. 1–8). 
http://doi.org/10.1109/COMSNETS.2012.6151339 
Hantzis, F. (2015). Ncrack - High-speed network authentication cracker. Retrieved February 
13, 2015, from https://nmap.org/ncrack/ 
Hay, B., Nance, K., Bishop, M., Brian, H., & Hay, B. (2011). Storm Clouds Rising: Security 
Challenges for IaaS Cloud Computing. In N. Kara & B. Matt (Eds.), System Sciences 
78 
(HICSS), 2011 44th Hawaii International Conference on (Vol. 0, pp. 1–7). CONF, 
Kauai, HI: IEEE Computer Society. Retrieved from internal-pdf://10-03-03-
2160270622/10-03-03.pdf 
Hofmann, A., & Sick, B. (2011). Online Intrusion Alert Aggregation with Generative Data 
Stream Modeling. Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on. JOUR. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2009.36 
IBM. (2015). IBM Cloud. Retrieved October 31, 2015, from http://www.softlayer.com/ 
IDG. (2014). IDG Enterprise Cloud Computing Study 2014. Retrieved October 31, 2015, 
from http://www.idgenterprise.com/report/idg-enterprise-cloud-computing-study-2014 
Jansen, W., & Grance, T. (2011). Guidelines on security and privacy in public cloud 
computing. NIST Special Publication, 800, 144. JOUR. 
Jiang, G., Chen, H., Yoshihira, K., & Saxena, A. (2011). Ranking the importance of alerts for 
problem determination in large computer systems. Cluster Computing, 14(3), 213–227. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10586-010-0120-0 
Kandukuri, B. R., Paturi, V. R., & Rakshit, A. (2009). Cloud Security Issues. In Services 
Computing, 2009. SCC ’09. IEEE International Conference on (pp. 517–520). CONF. 
Retrieved from internal-pdf://05283911-1171854084/05283911.pdf 
Khorshed, M. T., Ali, A. B. M. S., & Wasimi, S. A. (2011). Monitoring Insiders Activities in 
Cloud Computing Using Rule Based Learning. Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing 
and Communications (TrustCom), 2011 IEEE 10th International Conference on. CONF. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom.2011.99 
Kumar, V. (2012). Signature Based Intrusion Detection System Using SNORT. IJCAIT, 1(3), 
35–41. Journal Article. 
Lee, J.-H., Park, M.-W., Eom, J.-H., & Chung, T.-M. (2011). Multi-level Intrusion Detection 
System and log management in Cloud Computing. Advanced Communication 
Technology (ICACT), 2011 13th International Conference on. CONF. 
Lin, C. (2009). Modeling and Analyzing Dynamic Forensics System Based on Intrusion 
Tolerance. In L. Zhitang, G. Cuixia, & L. Yingshu (Eds.), Computer and Information 
Technology, International Conference on (Vol. 2, pp. 230–235). CONF. Retrieved from 
79 
internal-pdf://3836b230-3469768729/3836b230.pdf 
Lori, M. K. (2010). Can Public-Cloud Security Meet Its Unique Challenges?, 8, 55–57. 
MGZN. Retrieved from internal-pdf://msp2010040055-
0820948992/msp2010040055.pdf 
Lyon, G. (2015). Nmap: The Network Mapper. Retrieved March 2, 2015, from 
https://nmap.org/ 
Ma, J., Li, Z., & Zhang, H. (2009). A fusion model for network threat identification and risk 
assessment. In Artificial Intelligence and Computational Intelligence, 2009. AICI’09. 
International Conference on (Vol. 1, pp. 314–318). CONF, IEEE. 
Mandiant. (2014). M-Trends: Beyond the Breach - 2014 Threat Report. 2014. Retrieved from 
https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/WP_M-Trends2014_140409.pdf 
Maxim, M. (2011). Defending against insider threats to reduce your IT risk. Security and 
Compliance, Jan. JOUR. 
Mell, P., & Grance, T. (2011). The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing.[Online] 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145. SP800-145.pdf. JOUR. 
Microsoft. (2015). Microsoft Cloud. Retrieved October 31, 2015, from 
http://www.microsoft.com/enterprise/microsoftcloud/default.aspx#fbid=Sz0L-G7AlOP 
Mihaescu, C. (n.d.). Naive-Bayes Classification Algorithm. Retrieved October 15, 2015, from 
http://software.ucv.ro/~cmihaescu/ro/teaching/AIR/docs/Lab4-NaiveBayes.pdf 
Mohamed, H., Adil, L., Saida, T., & Hicham, M. (2013). A collaborative intrusion detection 
and Prevention System in Cloud Computing. AFRICON, 2013. CONF. 
http://doi.org/10.1109/AFRCON.2013.6757727 
Murilo, N., & Steding-Jessen, K. (n.d.). chkrootkit. Retrieved March 13, 2015, from 
http://www.chkrootkit.org/ 
Nikolai, J., & Wang, Y. (2014). Hypervisor-based cloud intrusion detection system. In 2014 
International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC) (pp. 
989–993). http://doi.org/10.1109/ICCNC.2014.6785472 
Nikolai, J., & Wang, Y. (2016a). A Streaming Intrusion Monitoring and Classification System 
80 
for IaaS Cloud. In 2016 IEEE 9th International Conference on Cloud Computing. 
Nikolai, J., & Wang, Y. (2016b). A System for Detecting Malicious Insider Data Theft in IaaS 
Cloud Environments. In IEEE GLOBECOM 2016. 
Nurmi, D., Wolski, R., Grzegorczyk, C., Obertelli, G., Soman, S., Youseff, L., & 
Zagorodnov, D. (2009). The eucalyptus open-source cloud-computing system (pp. 124–
131). CONF, IEEE. 
Oppenheimer, D. L., & Martonosi, M. R. (1997). Performance signatures: A mechanism for 
intrusion detection. In Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Information Survivability 
Workshop. Conference Proceedings. 
Peffers, K., Tuunanen, T., Rothenberger, M. A., & Chatterjee, S. (2007). A design science 
research methodology for information systems research. Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 24(3), 45–77. JOUR. 
Ren, K., Wang, C., & Wang, Q. (2012). Security challenges for the public cloud. IEEE 
Internet Computing, 16(1), 69–73. http://doi.org/10.1109/MIC.2012.14 
Rish, I. (2001). An empirical study of the naive Bayes classifier. In IJCAI 2001 workshop on 
empirical methods in artificial intelligence (Vol. 3, pp. 41–46). CONF, IBM New York. 
Saad, S., & Traore, I. (2011). A semantic analysis approach to manage IDS alerts flooding. 
Proceedings of the 2011 7th International Conference on Information Assurance and 
Security, IAS 2011, 156–161. http://doi.org/10.1109/ISIAS.2011.6122812 
Salem, M. B., Hershkop, S., & Stolfo, S. J. (2008). A survey of insider attack detection 
research. Insider Attack and Cyber Security, 69–90. JOUR. 
Salem, M. Ben, Hershkop, S., & Stolfo, S. J. (2008). A survey of insider attack detection 
research. In Insider Attack and Cyber Security (pp. 69–90). CHAP, Springer. 
Sanfilippo, S. (2013). Hping [Web Page]. Retrieved January 15, 2015, from 
http://www.hping.org/ 
Sanfilippo, S. (2015). hping. Retrieved July 12, 2015, from http://www.hping.org/ 
SANS. (2001). Defense in Depth. http://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0502-101 
Sheridan, J., & Cooper, C. (2012). Whitepaper: Defending the Cloud (Report). (R. I. Security, 
81 
Ed.). 
Singhal, A., Qin, X., & Lee, W. (2007). Discovering Novel Attack Strategies from Infosec 
Alerts. Data Warehousing and Data Mining Techniques for Cyber Security, 31, 109–
157. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-47653-7_7 
Socketsoft.net. (2013). [Web Page]. Retrieved from http://www.socketsoft.net/ 
Sriram, M., Patel, V., Harishma, D., & Lakshmanan, N. (2014). A Hybrid Protocol to Secure 
the Cloud from Insider Threats. Cloud Computing in Emerging Markets (CCEM), 2014 
IEEE International Conference on. CONF. http://doi.org/10.1109/CCEM.2014.7015476 
Stolfo, S. J., Salem, M. B., & Keromytis, A. D. (2012). Fog Computing: Mitigating Insider 
Data Theft Attacks in the Cloud. Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2012 IEEE 
Symposium on. CONF. http://doi.org/10.1109/SPW.2012.19 
Sutton, O. (2012). Introduction to k Nearest Neighbour Classification and Condensed Nearest 
Neighbour Data Reduction. University Lectures, University of Leicester. JOUR. 
Takabi, H., Joshi, J. B. D., & Ahn, G. J. (2010). Security and privacy challenges in cloud 
computing environments. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 8(6), 24–31. JOUR. 
Taleb, N. N. (2010). The black swan:: The impact of the highly improbable fragility (Vol. 2). 
BOOK, Random House. 
Taylor, J. B., & Williams, J. C. (2008). A black swan in the money market (RPRT). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Valeur, F., Vigna, G., Kruegel, C., & Kemmerer, R. A. (2004). Comprehensive approach to 
intrusion detection alert correlation. In Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE 
Transactions on (Vol. 1, pp. 146–169). JOUR. http://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2004.21 
Wen, S., Xiang, Y., & Zhou, W. (2010). A Lightweight Intrusion Alert Fusion System. 2010 
IEEE 12th International Conference on High Performance Computing and 
Communications (HPCC), (1), 695–700. CONF. http://doi.org/10.1109/HPCC.2010.120 
Willis-Ford, C. (2015). Education & Awareness: Manage the Insider Threat. In Fissea 
Working Group. Retrieved from http://csrc.nist.gov/organizations/fissea/2015-
conference/presentations/march-24/fissea-2015-willis-ford.pdf 
82 
Zikopoulos, P., & Eaton, C. (2011). Understanding big data: Analytics for enterprise class 
hadoop and streaming data. Book, McGraw-Hill Osborne Media. 
 
 
 
 
83 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: HCIDS SYSTEM DESIGN 
System Design 
 
Figure 22.  Hypervisor-Based Cloud Intrusion Detection System Design 
Snode.py 
This program retrieves system metric data every second from the hypervisor and passes it to 
CHIDS.spl for analysis. 
CHIDS.spl 
This program looks for abnormal spikes in metric data and then compares to known attack 
patterns.  Then, it sends the attack information to the SCIMCS system.  
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APPENDIX B: SCIMCS SYSTEM DESIGN 
System Design 
 
Figure 23.  Streaming Intrusion Monitoring and Classification System Design 
Launch.sh 
This script was used for starting the sensors during experimentation. 
Snortsensor.py 
This program retrieves data from the popular Snort intrusion detection system, formats it, and 
passes it the MSIDS.spl. 
checkrootkit.py 
This program uses the chkrootkit package to search for known rootkits.  It formats the output 
and passes any results to MSIDS.spl. 
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Logsensor.py 
This program retrieves and formats data from log files.  Then, it sends the data to MSIDS.spl. 
Tcpipsensor.py 
This code was originally written by someone going under the handle Silver Moon.  It was 
modified to sniff tcp/ip traffic, format it and send the data to tcpanomalyfinder.spl. 
MSIDS.spl 
This program ingests data from sensors, buffers the data, and controls the flow rate into 
analyzer.py. 
Tcpanomalyfinder.spl 
This program ingests sniffed formatted data from tcpipsensor.py and looks for anomalies in 
the rate at which packets are sent and the size.  Then, abnormal activity is labeled using rules 
based on observation.  The output is sent to MSIDS.spl. 
Analyzer.py 
This program does the counting, weighting, and persistence of alerts.  It can be considered the 
brain of the system.  The major calculations are done here.  As alerts come into the program, 
they are given a value and passed to detector.spl. 
Detector.spl 
This program looks for anomalies in alert message scores from analyzer.  This performs a 
filtration effect to stop overwhelming administrators with redundant alerts.  In addition, alerts 
are ranked high, medium, or low and passed to classifer.py 
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Classifer.py 
This program has two modes:  training and monitor.  In training mode, it takes groups of 
alerts and stores.  A label can be assigned.  In monitor mode, the program looks for groups of 
messages that match previously observed patterns using Bayes classification.  The alert data is 
sent off to be rendered on a web page.  
visualize.html 
This html script utilizes Google visualization APIs to visualize the output from classifer.py. 
Get_data.cgi 
This script feeds data to the visualize.html page for visualizing the output from classifer.py. 
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APPENDIX C: A SYSTEM FOR DETECTING INSIDER DATA 
THEFT DESIGN 
System Design 
 
Figure 24.  Insider Data Theft Detector System Design 
Insider.py 
This program gathers the data from the nodes and performs the agent role in the research. 
insider_scoring.py 
This program has two modes:  training and monitoring.  In training mode, data is sent to 
InsiderThreatDetectorTrainer.spl where normal patterns are learned.  In monitoring mode, 
data is enriched from the training data and is sent to InsiderThreatDetectorMonitor.spl where 
abnormal usage is detected. 
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InsiderThreatDetectorTrainer.spl 
This program calculates anomaly values for each metric passed in and then writes to data 
files.  
Parse_training_data.py 
This program reads data files and generates insiderdata.json with the max values observed 
during the training period. 
InsiderThreatDetectorMonitor.spl 
This program takes in metric data, calculates an anomaly score and compares the score to the 
maximum score observed during training.  
insider_detection.py 
This program ingests the anomaly data from InsiderThreatDetectorMonitor.spl and issues the 
alerts. 
 
